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I. INTRODUCTION
As all of us are aware, there has been concern throughout
our legal system about the trauma that child victims of sexual
abuse suffer when testifying at criminal trials. It is likely that
these same concerns will follow into the civil arena as civil
cases for sexual abuse of child victims become more common.1
In response, advocates of child victims will propose that video-
1. Over the last several years, an unprecedented number of sexual
molestation claims, particularly involving child sexual abuse, have been
pursued in the courts.... The costs of defending such actions are substantial,
and the jury awards are potentially astronomical. According to a confidential
report prepared for U.S. Catholic bishops, it is estimated that the Roman
Catholic Church alone could face more than $1 billion in legal claims through
1995 because of lawsuits against priests charged with child molestation.
Eileen B. Eglin, Liability Coverage for Sexual Molestation Claims, FOR THE DEFENSE,
July 1988, at 6.
[Vol. 15:261
Videotaped Depositions In Civil Trials
tapes of child depositions be admitted in trial in place of live
testimony. Such evidence may have profound effects on juries
and may also alter the role of advocates in our civil system.
This Article, however, is not about the effect of videotaped
testimony on a jury,2 or about whether the advocate of the
future will be more of a film editor than an orator, or more of
a visual than an oral storyteller. Rather, this Article is about
how the possibility of videotaped child depositions offers a
promise that the law cannot keep. Video depositions in civil
cases promise sexual child abuse victims a kinder, gentler path
to compensation. This promise cannot be kept because, pre-
tend as we might, what we create within the categorical world
of the law cannot be hermetically sealed off from the outer
world. Legal realists are concerned with the seepage of influ-
ences from the outer world into the legal domain.3 Conversely,
this Article focuses upon seepage from the legal domain into
the outer world.
We will follow the journey of one well-intentioned legally
created solution, clothed as a gloss upon the evidentiary rules
governing depositions, as it drifts into the world outside.4 As
we follow the video deposition solution, it will interact with
the psychology of child molesters and advocates, the economics
of daycares, the emergence of working mothers in the Ameri-
can workforce, and the reactions of institutions providing
insurance. Yet, at the journey's end, the solution will be but
an empty promise.
This journey begins in the comfortable, self-contained
world of the law and legal arguments about the admissibility of
a child's deposition in civil sex abuse cases. I will show, in Sec-
tion II-A, that it is plausible to believe that trial courts will
routinely accept such arguments. I will then consider, in Sec-
tion II-B, why principles of collateral estoppel will not shield
the child victim from testifying at trial.
In considering the resulting consequences, I will examine,
2. For an insightful exploration of the possible impact of video texts on our
jurisprudence, see Ronald K.L. Collins and David Skover, Paratexts, 44 STAN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 1992).
3. See, e.g., Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional
Ap'proach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 812 (1935).
4. Some might, however, deny any significant separation between the "real"
world, with its manipulation of power, favor trading, and bureaucracies, and the day-
to-day world of law. See, e.g., Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139
U. PA. L. REV. 801 (1991).
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in Section III-A, the broader implications of accepting the evi-
dentiary arguments. I will then explore, in Section III-B, the
impact of routine acceptance of these evidentiary arguments on
the behavior of the child and his or her parents or guardians,
the defense bar, and the plaintiff bar. We will see that more
sexual molestation suits will likely be brought and favorably
settled for the plaintiff as a result of the alteration in behavior
of all three categories of the above players. From here, in Sec-
tion III-C, I will assess the impact of the projected increase in
civil molestation cases and favorable settlements on compensa-
tion for victims and deterrence of future child sexual abuse.
The consequences of an increase in civil molestation cases
and in favorable plaintiff settlements will affect different cate-
gories of defendants in different ways. The first category of
defendants consist of individual abusers who are the direct per-
petrators of the sexual molestation. These defendants will
neither offer sources of compensation nor be deterred from
committing further sexual abuse by the prospect of civil suit
for reasons we will encounter involving human psychology,
economics, and the behavior of the insurance industry.
The second category of defendants consists of noninstitu-
tional vicariously liable defendants. This category includes
nonparticipating spouses or significant others who knew or
should have known about their mate's behavior yet failed to
act. Also included in this category are operators of family
home daycares (i.e., daycares conducted in the owner's home,
generally involving a few children in addition to the owner's)
who negligently hired or supervised employees. We will see
that these would-be defendants may change their behavior
somewhat to decrease the possibility of molestation in the face
of an increased chance of civil suit. However, this group fares
little better than the first group of defendants as a source of
compensation for many of the same reasons.
The final category of defendants consists of vicariously lia-
ble institutional entities. These are for-profit, nonprofit, and
employer-sponsored daycare facilities, and state daycare licens-
ing agencies. They face liability for negligent hiring, supervi-
sion, licensing, and inspection. Unlike the first two categories
of defendants, these institutional defendants both offer sources
for compensation and respond to the risk of suit by taking
steps to reduce the risk of sexual child abuse. Nevertheless,
there are potential downsides to these institutions' risk averse
[Vol. 15:261
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behavior and their responses are largely intertwined with the
behavior of insurance institutions. Thus, the journey leads us
to explore the past, present, and future relationship of insur-
ance companies to daycares.
The journey ends with a stark reality. Although more
cases may be brought and although daycares and government
agencies may respond in ways that will diminish instances of
molestation as a result, sources of money will simply not be
available to compensate most child victims of sexual abuse.
II. ADMITrING VIDEOTAPED TESTIMONY INTO EVIDENCE
A. The Reasons That Video Depositions Will Be Admitted
There are several reasons why trial courts will readily
admit video depositions in civil child molestation suits into
evidence.
1. Judicial Concern for Child Welfare
The child's counsel's evidentiary arguments will take place
against the backdrop of a legal system with a traditional con-
cern for the welfare of children.5 Recently this system has
become all but obsessed with the well-being of child sexual
abuse victims in the litigation process.6 Of particular concern
is the potentially traumatic and psychologically harmful conse-
quences to the child victim of requiring his or her testimony at
5. The United States Supreme Court has consistently recognized "society's
transcendent interest in protecting the welfare of children." Ginsberg v. New York,
390 U.S. 629, 640 (1968) (quoting People v. Kahan, 206 N.E.2d 333, 334 (N.Y. 1965)
(Fuld, J., concurring)) (society can ban sale of sexually explicit literature to children),
reh'g denied, 391 U.S. 971 (1968). See also, Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990) (court
upheld state statute prohibiting possession or viewing of child pornography), reh'g
denied, 110 S. Ct. 2605 (1990); FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 749-50 (1978)
(interest in youth justifies curb on "indecent" radio broadcasts), rehg denied, 439 U.S.
883 (1978); Sharon Parker Brustein, Note, Coy v. Iowa: Should Children Be Heard And
Not Seen?, 50 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1187, 1196-98 (1989).
6. See, e.g., Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990); Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012
(1988); Beth Bjerregaard, Televised Testimony as an Alternative in Child Sexual Abuse
Cases, 25 CRIM. L. BuLL. 164 (1989); Jacqueline Y. Parker, The Rights of Child
Witnesses: Is The Court a Protector or Perpetrator?, 17 NEw ENG. L. REV. 643 (1982);
Steven M. Romanoff, Comment, The Use of Closed-Circuit Television Testimony in
Child Sexual Abuse Cases: A Twentieth Century Solution to a Twentieth Century
Problem, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 919 (1986); Rachel I. Wollitzer, Note, Sixth
Amendment-Defendant's Right to Confront Witnesses: Constitutionality of
Protective Measures in Child Sexual Assault Cases, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 759
(1988).
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a criminal trial.7 As one commentator has observed:
Several researchers have determined that traditional court
procedures add to a child's psychological scars, producing
"system-induced trauma." One study compared a sample of
children who had testified in court with a random sample of
sex abuse victims and found that 73 percent of the court vic-
tims had behavioral problems compared with only 57 percent
of the random sample. The researchers attributed the differ-
ences to the trauma of testifying in court. Others have also
reported that child sex abuse victims who must participate
in court proceedings experience greater trauma than those
who do not. These differences, however, may be attributable
to the fact that it is usually the most serious cases that result
in a trial.
Other researchers have found that child sexual abuse
victims often suffer from a variety of problems including
confusion, depression, shame, and guilt. One commentator
relates that many sexually abused children display symp-
toms such as fear for their safety, feelings of depression and
7. See, e.g., Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3167-68; Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,
457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982) ("protection of minor victims of sex crimes from further
trauma and embarrassment" is compelling). See also, Josephine A. Buckley,
Evidentiary and Procedural Trends and Other Emerging Legal Issues in Child Sexual
Abuse Cases, 89 DICK. L. REV. 645, 646-48 (1985); Parker, supra note 6, at 643-57;
Stephanie Ann Holmes, Note, "Lights, Camera, Action" Videotaping and Closed-
Circuit Television Procedures Coyly Confront the Sixth Amendment, 40 S.C. L. REV.
693, 695 (1989); Romanoff, supra note 6, at 920-22; David R. Wise, Comment, Criminal
Procedure-Child Witness-The Constitutionality of Admitting the Videotape
Testimony at Trial of Sexually Abused Children, 7 WHITTIER L. REV. 639, 639 (1985);
Wollitzer, supra note 6, at 783-86; Maria H. Bainor, Note, The Constitutionality of the
Use of Two-Way Closed Circuit Television to Take Testimony of Child Victims of Sex
Crimes, 53 FoRDHAM L. REV. 995, 997 (1985); Note, The Testimony of Child Victims in
Sex Abuse Prosecutions: Two Legislative Innovations, 98 HARv. L. REV. 806, 807 (1985)
[hereinafter Note, Legislative Innovations].
Some recent commentators have noted, however, that although stressful for some
children, the process is not so for others. Gail S. Goodman and Vicki S. Helgeson,
Child Sexual Assault Children's Memories and the Law, in PAPERS FROM A
NATIONAL POLICY CONFERENCE ON LEGAL REFoRMs IN CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES, A
REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CHID SEXuAL ABUSE LAW REFORM
PROJECT 41, 53 (1985) [hereinafter, ABA REPORT]; Lucy Berliner, The Child Witness:
The Progress and Emerging Limitations, in ABA REPORT, 95, 102 (1985); Buckley,
supra, at 648 (1985). One commentator even reported that most children can testify
"without much difficulty." Michael H. Graham, The Confrontation Clause, the
Hearsay Rule, and Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: The State of the Relationship, 72
MINN. L. REV. 523, 560 n.192 (1988). But such an observation speaks only indirectly to
the question of whether the experience causes the child psychological harm. In fact,
some commentators suggest that, under some circumstances, participating and
testifying in a civil suit is beneficial, as it "empowers" the child-victim. See infra, note
83.
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anxiety, embarrassment, "nightmares that have an assaultive
content," guilt, and ambivalence. These symptoms can be
greatly aggravated by forcing a child to testify in open court
in front of his or her assailant. A survey of professionals
working with child victims revealed that the most frequently
mentioned fear of the children was that of facing the
defendant."
One cannot believe that the trauma resulting from testifying in
a civil trial will be any less.9
2. The Civil Context
For a number of reasons, the standards for admitting a
video deposition in a civil case will be far less stringent than
they would be in a criminal case. First, neither the stigma of
the criminal label nor a sanction that threatens to constrain
liberty or extinguish life is involved in a civil case.'0 Further-
more, in a civil case, unlike in a criminal proceeding, there is
no commitment to give the defendant every reasonable benefit
of the doubt," nor a concern for the protection of the individ-
8. Bjerregaard, supra note 6, at 169-70.
9. Although the legal system unequivocally supports the interests of young
children, a court may view children testifying as plaintiffs in civil cases as not raising
concerns comparable to those raised in the criminal process. In criminal cases, society
is attempting to vindicate itself and to protect other children from a child molester.
Unfortunately, the only real witnesses usually available to identify the molester will
be the already abused child. JOHN CREWDSON, By SILENCE BETRAYED 162 (1988). We
must, therefore, utilize these children in the criminal process if we are going to
achieve our societal end.
Civil cases are different. Arguably, no great societal purpose is at stake; rather,
the children and their families simply want money. At some level, a court may believe
that any suffering in the civil process is the result of the family's private decision to
seek money and therefore does not require the extreme concern that is shown in
criminal cases.
However, not all the cases expressing concern about the welfare of young children
arose in the context of prosecutions for sexual child abuse. See cases cited supra note
5. Moreover, a child has as much of a right as anyone to bring a case to trial. Having
done so, the child is subject to harms that would not likely befall an adult in similar
circumstances, and the child has as great a need for court protection in a civil case as
does a child in a criminal case. There is, therefore, no reason that a court should not
be solicitous of the welfare of children in civil cases.
10. "The accused during a criminal prosecution has at stake interests of immense
importance, both because of the possibility that he may lose his liberty upon conviction
and because of the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the conviction." In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970).
11. Several factors influence this conclusion. First, the rights provided to a
criminal defendant by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments preclude the prosecution from
utilizing the most obvious source of accurate information in the case: the defendant.
Furthermore, the prosecution must prove its case to the highest conceivable burden.
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ual from governmental power.'2 Civil litigants in fact have no
constitutional right to confrontation.13 Ironically, the criminal
defendant's right to confrontation is the very right that has
been the bane of commentators and courts seeking innovative
solutions to protecting sexually abused children from the
trauma of criminal trials.'4 Even the right of cross-examina-
tion, which is part of a litigant's general right to Due Process,'5
Finally, society picks up the bill for an indigent defendant's attorney who is armed
with a constitutional arsenal of weapons including cross-examination, compulsory
process, and confrontation. Taken together, these factors lead to the overwhelming
conclusion that the criminal system was intended to give the defendant every
reasonable benefit of the doubt.
The civil litigant does not possess the same battery of criminal defendant rights.
As Justice Harlan explained:
In a civil suit between two private parties for money damages, for example,
we view it no more serious in general for there to be an erroneous verdict in
the defendant's favor than for there to be an erroneous verdict in the
plaintiff's favor.... In a criminal case, on the other hand, we do not view the
social disutility of convicting an innocent man as equivalent to the disutility of
acquitting someone who is guilty.... In this context, I view the requirement
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case as bottomed on a
fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict
an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371-72 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). Cf also, Laurence
H. Tribe, An Ounce of Detention: Preventive Justice in the World of John Mitchell, 56
VA. L. REV. 371, 388 (1970).
12. In some sense, both the civil and criminal proceedings are concerned with the
"truth." The central thrust of the civil process, however, is a fair resolution of the
conflicting claims between a private plaintiff and private defendant. A criminal case is
quite different. The criminal case involves the power of government. Cf. Browning-
Ferris Indust. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 266 (1989) (in the
course of discussing the constitutionality of punitive damages in civil cases, the Court
noted, "the primary focus of the Eighth Amendment was the potential for
governmental abuse of its 'prosecutorial' power, not concern with the extent or
purposes of civil damages."). To be more precise, the criminal case involves a system
in which jurors, as members of society, stand between an individual citizen and the
government. The criminal process is thus a systematic check on the power of the
executive. John B. Mitchell, The Ethics of the Criminal Defense Attorney-New
Answers to Old Questions, 32 STAN. L. REV. 293, 299-302 (1980).
If we allow the government to bring weaker evidence before the jury in criminal
cases by removing the crucible of contemporaneous cross-examination, the protection
that the jury system offers against the abuse of executive power is weakened. There is
no comparable concern with civil litigation.
13. "The express constitutional right to confrontation is confined to criminal
proceedings." In re Mary S., 230 Cal. Rptr. 726, 729 (Cal. App. 1986). See also, Thomas
R. Finn, Child Witness Practice in Child Abuse Proceedings, 23 SuFFOLK U. L. REV.
271, 305 (1989). One court found that a videotaped deposition in a criminal case met
confrontation clause concerns. State v. Hobson, 61 Wash. App. 330, 810 P.2d 70 (1991).
14. See, e.g., Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990); Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct.
3139 (1990); Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
15. In re Mary S., 230 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
1992] Videotaped Depositions In Civil Trials
turns out to be quite watered-down in the civil context.1"
Against the backdrop of this watered-down species of cross-
examination, courts will be aware that civil defendants in child
sex abuse cases will still have a full opportunity to cross-
examine at a deposition.
More broadly, because substituting a videotape for live tes-
timony in a criminal case impinges on the constitutional rights
of contemporaneous cross-examination and confrontation, and
because constitutional rights may only be impaired if truly
"necessary,"17 criminal courts apply extremely strict standards
16. Courts and legal commentators appear far more accommodating of
situationally located justifications for deviation from a litigant's due process-based
cross-examination rights in the civil context than they do when dealing with
constitutional confrontation in the criminal arena. For example, in Derewecki v. Penn
R.R. Co., 353 F.2d 436, 442 (3d Cir. 1965), the court stated that a right to cross-
examination attaches in every adversary proceeding. However, the court admitted the
deposition of the plaintiff, who died before the deposition was completed and before
opposing counsel could conduct full cross-examination. In admitting the deposition,
the court found an "extraordinary situation," weighing the defendant's right to cross-
examination against the plaintiff's widow's ability to bring the suit. Id,
Similarly, general evidentiary rules require that a witness's direct examination be
stricken if a witness becomes sick or otherwise physically or mentally incapacitated
before cross-examination is begun or completed. CHARLES TIPFORD MCCORMICK,
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 19 at 49 (Edward W. Cleary et al. eds., 1984). However,
one commentator has suggested that "[i]n the case of the nonparty witness.., at least
in civil cases, it is arguable that this result should be qualified so that the judge is
directed to exclude unless he is clearly convinced that the incapacity is genuine, in
which event he should let the direct testimony stand... He should then be authorized
to explain to the jury the weaknesses of such uncross-examined evidence." I& (citing
Note, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 327 (1927)) (emphasis added). The same commentator
suggests that in a civil, as opposed to a criminal case, the direct examination of a
witness who has died before cross-examination should be allowed to stand on the
theory that "common sense tells us that the half-loaf of direct testimony is better than
no bread at all." I& See also id n.21.
17. Although few constitutional rights are absolute, we tend to take these rights
seriously. Common sense dictates that this level of seriousness requires a showing that
it is "necessary" to impinge upon a constitutional right.
Not surprisingly, the necessity requirement is specifically reflected in several cases
that deal with attempts to protect the interests of young children. Thus, in Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982), although specifically finding that
"the protection of minor victims of sex crimes from further trauma" is a compelling
state interest, the Supreme Court nevertheless refused to uphold a statute mandating
the closing of courtrooms to the press and public in every case where the sexual abuse
of a minor was involved. Id, at 608. Rather, the Court required a determination of
necessity in the particular case at hand before it would permit First Amendment
rights to be circumscribed. Id.
Similarly, in Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988), the Court struck down an
innovative attempt to shield a child witness from the trauma of directly confronting an
alleged molester because the statute involved permitting this procedure on an across-
the-board basis without any specific finding as to the necessity of its use in the
particular case. Id. at 1025. In a later case, the Court reiterated its stance in Coy.
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before excusing witnesses from presenting their testimony in
person at trial.18 In contrast, in a civil case, all that is at stake
when substituting video for live testimony are evidentiary
rules underlain by a preference for live testimony.19 A showing
of "good cause" should be more than sufficient to overcome
this preference.' Thus, the differences in constitutional pro-
"[O]ur precedents confirm that a defendant's right to confront accusatory witnesses
may be satisfied absent a physical, face-to-face confrontation at trial only where denial
of such confrontation is necessary to further an important public policy and only
where the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured." Maryland v. Craig, 110 S.
Ct. 3157, 3166 (1990) (emphasis added).
18. A continuance until a witness can recover from a disability, rather than a
finding of witness unavailability, is the norm in the criminal process. See, e.g., United
States v. Faison, 679 F.2d 292, 297 (3d Cir. 1982); Warren v. United States, 436 A.2d 821,
828 (D.C. 1981); People v. Lombardi, 332 N.Y.S.2d 749, 750-51 (1972), aff'd, 303 N.E.2d
705 (N.Y. 1973), cert denied, 416 U.S. 906 (1974). Some courts have even required a
showing that the witness will suffer a breakdown or some comparable malady that
makes attendance "relatively impossible." People v. Stritzinger, 668 P.2d 738, 747 (Cal.
1983) (quoting People v. Williams, 155 Cal. Rptr. 414, 420 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979)). See
generally, Graham, supra note 7, at 557-62:
Witnesses who testify in open court often suffer some emotional distress.
Many, if not most, rape victims suffer severe emotional distress trauma while
testifying, especially when face-to-face with the accused. Presumably, so do
many other groups of victims. Unavailability requires more than merely
showing the possibility of emotional distress or trauma, even more than
showing a likelihood that such emotional distress or trauma will be
substantial or severe: a showing of substantial likelihood of severe emotional
or mental harm is required.
Id. at 560.
19. Hearsay exceptions which require unavailability express a "rule of
preference." 4 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE,
I 804(a)[01], at 804-35 (1991). It is preferable to have the declarant available in court;
but, if that cannot be, the admission of the hearsay "is preferable to losing all evidence
from the source." Id. See also FED. R. EVID. 804(b) advisory committee's note:
Subdivision (b). Rule 803 supra, is based upon the assumption that a hearsay
statement falling within one of its exceptions possesses qualities which justify
the conclusion that whether the declarant is available or unavailable is not a
relevant factor in determining admissibility. The instant rule proceeds upon a
different theory: hearsay which admittedly is not equal in quality to
testimony of the declarant on the stand may nevertheless be admitted if the
declarant is unavailable and if his statement meets a specied standard. The
rule expresses preferences: testimony given on the stand in person is
preferred over hearsay, and hearsay, if of the specified quality, is preferred
over complete loss of the evidence of the declarant The exceptions that
evolved at common law with respect to declarations of unavailable declarants
furnish the basis for the exceptions enumerated in the proposal.
(Emphasis added).
20. "Good cause" is a familiar standard for all those involved in the civil process.
It currently provides the standard for protective orders, FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c), medical
examinations, FED. R. CIV. P. 35, and in the past was the standard for all discovery.
Although requiring a meaningful showing to the court, the "good cause" standard is
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tections between criminal and civil cases suggest that video
depositions will be admitted in civil cases.
3. Videotape Reliability
One of the strongest arguments for admitting videotapes is
that color videotapes are reliable and relatively comparable
substitutes for live testimony.2' Video depositions22 can fairly
present a witness's evidence if appropriate taping procedures
are followed. 23 Moreover, as prior recorded testimony,2 depo-
sitions are among the most reliable of all forms of hearsay.'
Additionally, the defendant will have had the opportunity to
obviously a less demanding standard for unavailability than the "necessity" standard
required in criminal cases. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
This less stringent civil standard is consistent with the entire treatment of civil
sexual child abuse cases. "[I]n a civil case.... it is easier to find unavailability even
when the disability is only temporary." WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 19,
804(a)[01], at 804-45. In civil cases, a less serious disability is accepted as justifying
unavailability. McCoRMicx, supra note 16, § 253, at 755 (3d ed. 1984). See, e.g.,
Crossley v. Lieberman, 868 F.2d 566, 568-69 (3d Cir. 1989) (elderly witness, a heavy
smoker who had trouble breathing and who had no car and would therefore have to
take public transportation to trial, found unavailable). In fact, the advisory
committee's note to FED. R. EvID. 804(a) states that civil litigants are held to a "lesser
standard" in regard to the efforts they must make to procure the attendance of a
witness at trial.
21. Contrast this with the cases where the witnesses have asked to be excluded
from giving any testimony at all. See, e.g., Kashishian v. State, 386 A.2d 666 (Del.
1978); State v. Gilbert, 326 N.W.2d 744 (Wis. 1982).
22. The use of videotape depositions appears to be generally accepted. See
generally FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(4); State ex rel. Lucas v. Moss, 498 S.W.2d 289 (Mo.
1973) (en banc); Rubino v. G.D. Searle & Co., 340 N.Y.S.2d 574 (1973).
23. See Alexander R. Sussman and Edna R. Sussman, Electronic Depositions, 15
LITIG. 26, 28-29 (Summer 1989) (discussing videotaping techniques). Cf. Romanoff,
supra note 6, at 932-35 (1986).
24. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) provides an exception to the hearsay rule for prior
recorded, or "former," testimony:
Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same or a different
proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with law in the course of
the same or another proceeding, if the party against whom the testimony is
now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had
an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or
redirect examination.
(Emphasis added.)
Depositions generally fulfill the requirements of 804(b)(1). FED. R. Civ. P. 32(a)
analogously permits the deposition of a witness to be "used by any party for any pur-
poses upon a proper showing." Most state jurisdictions have some statutory or com-
mon law counterpart to these two sections.
25. Of all the categories of testimony excepted from the hearsay rule, prior
recorded testimony is among the most reliable: Attorneys are generally present, an
oath is taken, the opportunity for cross-examination is afforded, and a verbatim
transcript is made. See FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(1) advisory commitee's note.
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cross-examine at the recording of the deposition.26 In fact, the
principle objection that the commentators to Fed. R. Evid.
804(b)(1) find in a deposition is its absence of information
about witness "demeanor. '27 A videotape of the witness pro-
vides much of this missing element. Although watching a
video is not the same as viewing a live witness, it is sufficiently
similar to provide adequate "demeanor" information.' The
reliability of videotaped depositions thus suggests that they
will be admitted in civil child molestation cases.
4. Accessible "Unavailability"
A finding that the child is "unavailable" for trial is a
26. For a variety of reasons peculiar to these cases, the defense should have little
trouble conducting meaningful cross-examination, even though the deposition may
take place early in the discovery phase. For example, the issues to which the child will
testify will not be very complex, and the defense should be able to easily develop the
information it desires. Indeed, the basic facts have likely already been fleshed out and
documented in reports and transcripts of a prior related criminal case.
In an effort to develop more effective cross-examination, defense counsel may
argue that the court should permit an initial "discovery" deposition before the full-
blown videotaping of the child's deposition. Although having some initial appeal,
courts should probably reject this claim, or at least limit it, by giving defense counsel
the first hour for discovery, taking a half hour break, and then continuing. Such a
rejection or limitation should occur because multiplying the formal confrontations
with adversary counsel by permitting more than one deposition is likely to add to the
stress on the child that the evidentiary arguments sought to avoid.
Note also that, when conducting this cross-examination, defense counsel should be
fully aware of the possibility that the child may be declared unavailable at trial and
that the deposition, therefore, might be presented to the jury. See infra notes 29-53
and accompanying text.
27. In fact, the most significant reservations the commentators express about
routinely substituting depositions for live testimony appear to be that the "opportunity
to observe demeanor is what in a large measure confers depth and meaning upon oath
and cross-examination. Thus in cases under Rule 803, demeanor lacks the significance
which it possesses with respect to [live] testimony." See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1)
advisory committee's notes (emphasis added). Videotaping supplies much of the
opportunity to observe demeanor. See infra note 28.
28. Most courts and commentators believe that "the effect on jurors of videotaped
testimony is comparable to live testimony." GREGORY P. JOSEPH, MODERN VISUAL
EVIDENCE, § 2.02 (1991). See also United States v. Binder, 769 F.2d 595, 600 (9th Cir.
1985) ("Videotape testimony is unique. It enables the jury to observe the demeanor
and to hear the testimony of the witness. It serves as the functional equivalent of a
live witness."); Reber v. General Motors Corp., 669 F. Supp. 717, 720 (E.D. Pa. 1987);
Commonwealth v. Stasko, 370 A.2d 350, 355 (Pa. 1977) (videotaped deposition allowed
jury opportunity to observe demeanor of witness and judge credibility); Wise, supra
note 7, at 656. But see Bjerregaard, supra note 6, at 174-75 (noting that although
studies indicate that there is no significant difference between jurors watching live or
videotaped testimony, "it may be hazardous to generalize from such conclusions to
child sex abuse cases as there have been no comparable studies conducted on child
witnesses.").
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legally necessary predicate for substituting the child's video
deposition for his or her live testimony. 9 Courts, however,
possess a broad range of sources for making this finding. In
finding unavailability, the courts can choose3° between the
numerous state counterparts of either Fed. R. Evid. 804(a) 31 or
Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a).32
29. A finding that the declarant/witness is legally "unavailable" is a predicate to
admission of the deposition. See FED. R. EVID. 804(a). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3).
30. Because courts can choose between FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(3) and FED. R. CIV. P.
32(a), it is only natural to question which takes precedence if one appears to permit or
forbid something that the other does not. Although a bit strange, the answer appears
to be that until Congress acts, they both apply, and a plaintiff may rely upon either
one. Scott E. Perwin, Use of Depositions in Federal Trials: Evidence or Procedure?, 16
LITc. 37, 39 (Fall 1989). See also WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 19, 1 804(b)(1)[01]
at 804-71:
Rule 32(a)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and section 3503 of title
18 of the United States Code together with Rule 15 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, govern the use of depositions in civil and criminal cases. They
create of their own force exceptions to the hearsay rule in the case of
unavailable deponents, which Rule 802 continues. As promulgated by the
Supreme Court Rule 804(b)(1) would have applied to depositions only to the
extent that they are offered in a proceeding different from the one in which
they are taken. Congress made the rule applicable to depositions taken in the
same proceeding as well
(Emphasis added, footnotes omitted).
The two rules, however, intersect. The 1970 Amendment of Rule 32(a) amended
the rule to read, "[a]t trial or upon the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory pro-
ceeding, any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence
applied as though the witness were then present and testifying, may be used against
any party who was present or represented at the taking of the deposition, or who had
reasonable notice thereof...." FED. R. Civ. P. 32(a) (emphasis added); FED. R. Civ. P.
32 advisory committee's note. The advisory committee note makes it clear that the
content of the deposition must satisfy the evidence code. 48 F.R.D. 487, 520, FED. R.
Crv. P. 32 advisory committee's note. Accord, Stroud v. Dorr-Oliver, Inc., 542 P.2d
1102, 1114 (Ariz. 1975), rehg denied, 544 P.2d 1089 (Ariz. 1976).
31. FED. R. EvID. 804(a) provides:
Definition of Unavailability. "Unavailability as a witness" includes situations
in which the declarant:
(1) Is exempted by ruling of the judge on the ground of privilege from
testifying concerning the subject matter of his statement; or
(2) Persists in refiusing to testify concerning the subject matter of his
statement despite an order of the judge to do so; or
(3) Testiftes to lack of memory of the subject matter of his statement; or
(4) Is unable to be present or to testify at a hearing because of death or then
existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or
(5) Is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement has been
unable to procure his attendance by process or other reasonable means.
(Emphasis added).
32. FED. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3) provides in part:
The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by a
party for any purpose if the court finds: (A) that the witness is dead; or (B)
that the witness is at a greater distance than 100 miles from the place of trial
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These rules provide a broad range of categories upon
which a court may rest its finding of unavailability. For exam-
ple, unavailability will be found if the child testifies to lack of
memory.33 Some child witnesses may have inadequate memo-
ries by the time of trial through repression, the stress of trial,
or the mere passage of time.' Additionally, the child may be
found incompetent to testify at trial and thus unavailable.'
or hearing, or is out of the United States, unless it appears that the absence of
the witness was procured by the party offering the deposition; or (C) that the
witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, illness, indJrmity, or
imprisonment, or (D) that the party offering the deposition has been unable
to procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena; or (E) upon application
and notice, that such exceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable,
in the interest of justice and with due regard to the importance of presenting
the testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to allow the deposition to be
used
(Emphasis added).
As you can see, FED. R. CIv. P. 32(a)(3) does not include the grounds of lack of
memory, refusal to answer, or privilege that are found in FED. R. EVID. 804(a). One
plausible inference from this distinction is that the civil rule focuses principally upon
the physical unavailability of the witness whereas the evidence rule concerns the
unavailability of witness's testimony. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 19,
1 804(a)[01], at 804-36; MCCORMICK, supra note 16, § 253, at 753. The distinction
between FED. R. Civ. P. 32 and FED. R. EvID. 804 may carry implications for unavaila-
bility analyses under FED. R. CIv. P. 32. See infra note 49.
33. Lack of memory is specifically provided for in FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(3). See
State v. Slider, 38 Wash. App. 689, 694, 688 P.2d 538, 541 (1984) (child unavailable
because of lack of memory), review denied, 103 Wash. 2d 1013 (1985). See also United
States v. Amaya, 533 F.2d 188, 191 (5th Cir. 1976) (witness declared unavailable due to
memory loss from which he was not likely to recover), cert denied, 429 U.S. 1101
(1977); Walden v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 654 F.2d 443, 446 (5th Cir. 1981) (error not to
find child unavailable who had no real memory of accident at time of trial); WEINSTEIN
& BERGER, supra note 19, 804(a)[01], at 804-42.
If a witness's memory is only partial, then the witness will be unavailable as to
those portions not remembered. MCCORMICK, supra note 16, § 253, at 755. See, e.g.,
United States v. MacDonald, 688 F.2d 224, 233 n. 14 (4th Cir. 1982) (declarant testified
at length but was "unavailable" as to parts where "she claimed a loss of memory"),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1103 (1983) .
34. See generally Legislative Innovations, supra note 7, at 807; Note, Minnesota's
Hearsay Ekception for Child Victims of Sexual Abuse, 11 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 799,
802, 806 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Minnesota]. High stress reduces the ability to
retrieve information. Gail S. Goodman & Vicki S. Helgeson, Child Sexual Assault
Children's Memory and the Law, in ABA REPORT, supra note 7, at 53. Over time
children's memories fade, but perhaps no more than adults. Interestingly, adults "fill-
in" their memories over time in order to make their stories remain coherent. Younger
children do not. Id. at 53. Thus, ironically, children's testimony may be more accurate
over time but less credible.
35. Although not specifically listed under either FED. R. Crv. P. 32(a)(3) or FED. R.
EVID. 804(a), a witness who lacks testamentary capacity is generally considered
"unavailable." See Haggins v. Warden, Fort Pillow State Farm, 715 F.2d 1050, 1055 (6th
Cir. 1983)("since declarant in this case was ruled incompetent to testify, she was
clearly unavailable"), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1071 (1984); State v. Ryan, 103 Wash. 2d
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165, 181, 691 P.2d 197, 207-08 (1984) (Dolliver, J., concurring); Graham, supra note 7, at
195. Cf. State v. Heib, 39 Wash. App. 273, 281, 693 P.2d 145, 151-52 (1984) (court implies
witness would be unavailable if found incompetent), rev'd on other grounds, 107 Wash.
2d 97, 727 P.2d 239 (1986).
This notion makes sense. If ruled incompetent, a "witness" cannot even take the
stand. FED. R. EVID. 104(a). Furthermore, "unavailability" refers to the unavailability
of a witness's testimony and not to the physical presence of a witness. WEINSTEIN &
BERGE., supra note 19, 804(a)[01], at 804-36; MCCORMICK, supra note 16, § 253, at 753.
An individual present who, as a matter of law, cannot tell truth from falsehood and
cannot get, retain, or express just impressions of the subject matter discussed, can
hardly be considered an "available" witness.
Although competent at the time of the deposition, a particular child witness may
be declared incompetent at trial for at least two reasons. First, courts have always
been concerned that the child's memory may no longer be sufficient. The child's
ability to remember the central event when a significant period of time has elapsed
between the event and the trial is critical. See, e.g., McCale v. Lynch, 110 Wash. 444,
449, 188 P. 517, 518-19 (1920) (incompetent because of lapse of time and extreme
suffering which "erased" memory). But see Kalberg v. Bon Marche, 64 Wash. 452, 454,
117 P. 227, 227-28 (1911) (competent in spite of three-year lapse between event and
trial). Second, the child may "freeze" on the witness stand and become
uncommunicative. See, e.g., State v. Gitchel, 41 Wash. App. 820, 826, 706 P.2d 1091,1094
(1985); State v. Shepphard, 484 A.2d 1330, 1333 (N.J. Super. 1984); See also Note,
Minnesota, supra note 34, at 806.
In any event, the plaintiff should bring a competency determination in those
jurisdictions where either a witness must understand the oath or where children
under a certain age are not presumed competent. See John B. Meyers, The
Testimonial Competence of Children, 25 J. FAM. L. 287, 306-07 (1986-87) Even in
jurisdictions following the federal rule that all witnesses are competent or in
jurisdictions with statutory schemes declaring that child abuse victims are competent,
judges still make competency determinations. Id. at 297-305, 307-08.
A competency determination should be made for at least two reasons. First, a
deponent is a witness who must undergo direct and cross-examination while under
oath. FED. R. Civ. P. 28, 30(c), 30(f). All of these elements require attributes of
competence. See, e.g., Stowers v. Carp, 172 N.E.2d 370, 377 (Ill. App. 1961) (party had
no right to take child's deposition unless competency decision made first); Bennett v.
Ross, 120 N.Y.S.2d 283, 283 (1950). Second, regardless of any finding of unavailability,
a finding that the deposed child was competent at the time of giving the deposition is
predicate to the admission of that deposition at trial. Parrott v. Wilson, 707 F.2d 1262,
1269 (11th Cir. 1983) (emphasis added), cert denied, 464 U.S. 936 (1983); Huff v. White
Motor Corp., 609 F.2d 286, 292 (7th Cir. 1979); McCutcheon v. Brownfield, 2 Wash.
App. 348, 355, 467 P.2d 868, 873 (1970), review denied, 78 Wash. 2d 993 (1970).
Several rationales support the position that a competency determination should be
made at the time of deposition. First, when a deposition is presented to a jury, the
deponent is "testifying" as a witness. A witness must be competent. See State v.
Wilson, 103 N.E.2d 552, 555, 556 (Ohio 1952) (deposition of child not admissible because
no showing that witness was competent at the time of deposition). Second, the
deposition is hearsay. Falling under a recognized hearsay exception does not facially
mean that all of the concerns underlying the hearsay rule will be met. The exceptions
themselves assume that the out-of-court declarant was competent at the time of
making the statement. Dean Wigmore notes that "the extrajudicial statements may be
inadmissible because of their failure to fulfill the ordinary rules about qualifications,
even though they may meet the requirements of a hearsay exception." 5 JOHN H.
WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1424, at 255 (James H. Chadbourn ed. 1974). See
also State v. Ryan, 103 Wash. 2d 165, 173, 691 P.2d 197, 203 (1984) ("if the declarant was
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Although competent at the time of deposition,38 a child may
subsequently be found incompetent at trial. For instance, the
child's memory may no longer be sufficient, or the child may
"freeze" on the witness stand and become uncommunicative.
Also, the child may refuse to testify out of fear of the defend-
ant. Adults who, in fear of the defendant, have refused to tes-
tify despite a court order, have been found unavailable.' A
young child's fear of possible retaliation potentially has at least
as great an impact and may result in a similar refusal to
testify.
not competent at the time of making the statements, the statements may not be
introduced through hearsay repetition"); Katrin E. Frank, Comment, Confronting
Child Victims of Sex Abuse: The Unconstitutionality of the Sexual Abuse Hearsay
Exception, 7 U. PUGET SOuND L. REv. 387, 393-94 (1984); Charles F. Stafford, The Child
As a Witness, 37 WASH. L. REv. 303, 306-07 (1962).
Third, and somewhat related to the second rationale, the various categories of
unavailability are all premised upon the underlying assumption that, were it not for
the reason causing the unavailability, the declarant could have been a witness. See
Frank, supra, at 393; WIGMORE, supra § 1445, at 304 ("If the declarant would have been
disqualified to take the stand by reason of infancy . .. his extra-judicial declaration
must also be inadmissible.") (quote taken from discussion of unavailability).
36. When considering admission of the video deposition, the court will generally
look at the child's competence at the time of the taking of the deposition and not at
the time of trial. See supra note 35. For this reason, counsel normally will want the
competency hearing to be contemporaneous with the deposition. In fact, in State v.
Wilson, 103 N.E.2d 552, 556-57 (Ohio 1952), the court stated that the trial court was
incapable of determining at trial whether or not a child was competent at the time of
giving his deposition. The Ohio Supreme Court stated that "[t]yped answers to
attorneys' questions read from a deposition cannot convey to the court the full
information to which the court is entitled, and the competency of the child cannot be
so established." Id. at 556.
In the case of videotaped depositions, the court would, of course, have more before
it than "typed answers." It would have a color videotape. Although giving more
information than the bare transcript, even a video would seem inadequate to the task.
A competency determination generally involves the court in actively examining the
child. Myers, supra note 35, at 337-46.
Admittedly, some courts make competency determinations regarding a declarant
at the time of a deposition using only the deposition and/or testimony about the
declarant's mental state at the relevant time. See McCutcheon, 2 Wash. App. at 355,
467 P.2d at 873 (competence can be discerned from nature of questions and answers at
deposition or expert testimony). See also Parrott, 707 F.2d at 1269 (no evidence of
incompetency at time of deposition despite examination of record); Huff, 609 F.2d at
292 (testimony shows declarant incompetent at time of deposition). However, all of
these cases involved adults who were presumed competent.
In addition, even if the court could in theory determine competency from a video,
the court should not necessarily do so. Because part of the competency decision is
backward looking anyway, the further the competency decision is from the event, the
less accurate it is.
37. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
38. See, e.g., Rice v. Marshall, 709 F.2d 1100, 1102 (6th Cir. 1983) (refused to testify
because threatened by defendant), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1034 (1984).
1992] Videotaped Depositions In Civil Trials
Perhaps the broadest and most amorphous category of
unavailability available to trial courts is the "then existing
mental illness or infirmity" category.39 Initially, courts applied
this category to those who were too ill to come into court40 and
to those who could walk into court but were insane.4 In the
past decade, courts have taken a bit of a conceptual leap and
applied this category to people who would become physically
or mentally ill from testifying itself.' This category of
39. Both FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(4) and FED. R. CIV. P. 32(a)(3)(C) specifically posit
findings of "illness" or "infirmity" as legitimate predicates for admission of a
deposition that then qualifies as prior recorded testimony under 804(b)(1). See supra
notes 31-32.
40. These witnesses were truly physically unavailable. See, e.g., United States v.
Rhodes, 713 F.2d 463 (9th Cir. 1983) (in hospital with heart attack and took Fifth
Amendment), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1012 (1983) and cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1038 (1984);
United States v. Faison, 679 F.2d 292, 296 (3d Cir. 1982) (heart attack, undergoing
surgery), aff'd, 725 F.2d 671 (3d Cir. 1983); Norburn v. Mackie, 141 S.E.2d 877, 879
(N.C. 1965) (stomach condition made long trip to court detrimental to witness's
health). But see Vigoda v. Barton, 204 N.E.2d 441, 446 (Mass. 1965) (no showing
seventy-two-year-old too sick to come into court).
41, Insanity is actually a competence problem resulting in unavailability of the
witness's evidence. See Parrott v. Wilson, 707 F.2d 1262, 1268 (11th Cir. 1983) (witness
who was delusional since accident was unavailable), cert denied, 464 U.S. 936 (1983);
State v. Williams, 9 Wash. App. 663, 665, 513 P.2d 1045, 1046 (1973) (witness had
breakdown on stand, became incomprehensible, and therefore unavailable due to
incompetency), rev'd on other grounds, 84 Wash. 2d 853, 529 P.2d 1088 (1975); State v.
Wahle, 298 N.W.2d 795, 798 (S.D. 1980) (declarant involuntarily committed to mental
institution). Cf. State v. Maestas, 584 P.2d 182, 189 (N.M. 1978) (mental problems made
testimony inadequate).
42. See, e.g., Worring v. State, 638 S.W.2d 678, 679 (Ark. Ct. App. 1982) (pregnant
woman unavailable when testimony would risk loss of child); People v. Lombardi, 332
N.Y.S.2d 749, 750-51 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972) (rape victim excused from testifying when
court found testifying would endanger her mental health and would likely lead to a
"further and perhaps successful attempt at suicide"), aff'd, 303 N.E.2d 705 (N.Y. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 906 (1974).
This set of cases, however, constitutes quite a jump from its predecessors. Indeed,
in considering a finding of unavailability on the grounds that the trauma from
testifying itself would cause the witness harm, one court recognized that it was
embarking on a relatively novel path. Warren v. United States, 436 A.2d 821, 827 (D.C.
1981).
Courts initially found unavailability under the illness rubric in the most concrete
context. Witnesses were unavailable who were too ill to come into court. See supra
note 40 and accompanying text. These witnesses were unavailable in a palpable
physical sense. Courts did not have to take a large step from there to find a witness
unavailable who, although physically capable of walking into the courtroom, was
insane. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. The issue in cases of insanity was
really one of legal competence. If a person could not function as a witness, the court
had little interest in the production of the witness's body. If the court wanted the
witness's information, it therefore would have to settle for a second best source such as
a deposition taken at the time the witness was competent.
In contrast, under the latest line of cases, if the very act of testifying would make
the witness physically or mentally ill, the witness would be found unavailable. This is
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unavailability, combined with a declaration or two from some
mental health professionals,43 should fit like the proverbial
glove with the desire to protect sexual child abuse victims from
the trauma they might suffer from testifying at trial." In the-
ory, courts could find the child unavailable as soon as the depo-
sition was completed, even though years before trial.4" Such a
finding could be made on grounds that, because the stress
caused by remaining in the process itself is harmful to the
child's health, the specter of the proceeding hanging overhead
is an obstacle to the child's progress in therapy." Although no
court has yet gone this far, if a court were so inclined, it could
a very different focus than the previous focus on the unavailability of the witness's
testimony. The new concern appears to be a humanitarian one, balancing the
importance of live testimony against the witness's health and finding in the balance
that it is simply not worth risking the witness's health. Although one could argue that
the older cases were also motivated by humanitarian concerns, it is more doctrinally
significant that the new category of cases employs a new vocabulary: "Harms from
testifying." This vocabulary is far more amorphous, especially in the psychological
realm, than inquiries into a witness's physical presence.
43. Plaintiff will still need to make a showing of "good cause." See supra note 20
and accompanying text. If Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990), is any guide,
however, the required showing may be quite minimal. In Craig, the Supreme Court
upheld a trial court finding that rested exclusively on conclusory expert declarations
and an absence of a court interview of the child. Id& at 3161, 3171.
44. The court can also rely upon what I call trauma-induced hybrid grounds. Such
grounds include incompetency as a result of trauma. C. Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct.
3157 (1990) (trauma will cause the child to become uncommunicative). Trauma-
induced hybrid grounds also include fear inducing a refusal to testify. People v. Rojas,
542 P.2d 229, 234, 236 (Cal. 1975) (when witness testified to "desperate fear" for
himself and his family, court held that "mental infirmity" included a mental state
induced by fear which impels a witness to refuse to testify).
45. A legislatively enacted exception to the hearsay rule would not have a
comparable effect. Generally, the evidence admitted through such an exception would
be simple statements of identity and wrongdoing ("he touched me here") rather than
the full range of information that may be required in a civil case. See infra Section II-
B. More importantly, the child would still be available to be called to the stand. See
infa Section III-B.
46. One may ask whether this finding of unavailability will only be made if the
child is undergoing, or about to undergo, therapy. As a factual matter, most children
bringing suit will be in counseling, if only because plaintiff's counsel will send them
for evaluation and counseling. Alternatively, the mental health professional doing the
evaluation may refer the child to a separate professional for counseling. If the child is
not in therapy, however, there may be difficulties persuading the trial court of the
child's unavailability.
In theory, whether or not the child is in counseling should not have this effect on
the finding. After all, the real point is that the child must go through a "healing"
process and removing the child from the litigation process will further this end. Yet
therapy provides the court with something concrete onto which it can tie notions of
harm from the process itself. In any event, even the child who is not in therapy will
almost certainly need evidence from a mental health professional to succeed in
showing unavailability.
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add this type of unavailability to Fed. R. Evid. 804(a),47 read it
into Fed. R. Evid. 804(a)(4), 41 invoke the "exceptional circum-
stances" exception in Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3)(E), 49 or designate
47. A number of arguments can be made that the grounds listed under FED. R.
EvID. 804(a) are not exclusive. McCormick states: "In principle probably anything
which constitutes unavailability in fact ought to be considered adequate." McCoRMICK,
supra note 16, § 253, at 754. FED. R. EVID. 804(a) specifically "includes situations," but
is not limited to the situations explicitly stated. Courts also seem to accept grounds
not specifically listed under FED. R. EVID. 804(a). See, e.g., Haggins v. Warden, Fort
Pillow State Farm, 715 F.2d 1050, 1055 (6th Cir. 1983) (child who is incompetent is
"unavailable"), cert denied, 464 U.S. 1071 (1984); United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d
77, 87 (8th Cir. 1980) (child "unavailable" when cannot be effectively cross-examined),
cert denied, 450 U.S. 1001 (1981).
There are counter arguments. McCormick went on to say "the rules have grown
up around certain recurring fact situations, and the problem is therefore approached in
that pattern." MCCORMICK, supra note 16, § 253, at 754. Further, in contrast to the
language of FED. R. EvM. 804(a), FED. R. EVID. 901(b) explicitly provides that the
listed methods of authentication are "[b]y way of illustration only, and not by way of
limitation." Finally, one could argue that the "catch-all" provisions, FED. R. EViD.
803(25) and 804(b)(5), provide the sole mechanisms for creating new hearsay
exceptions.
These counter arguments can be met with plausible responses. First, McCormick's
first statement that "in principle" anything which produces unavailability should be
adequate is a legal principle. His second statement is merely a factual-historical
observation. The fact that the drafters of FED. R. EVID. 901 did not want the reader to
think the stated authentication techniques were exclusive cannot be used to infer that
grounds included under FED. R. EVID. 804(a) were exclusive. The drafters merely
listed in 804(a) the historically accepted grounds to which they had become
accustomed. Last, harm to the child is not a new evidence "exception"; it is merely a
new ground for unavailability which can bring the existing evidence exceptions under
FED. R. EvID. 804 into play.
48. FED. R. EVID. 102 states that "[t]hese rules shall be construed to secure
fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and
promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth
may be ascertained in proceedings justly determined." (emphasis added).
Permitting parties to argue that the trial itself would cause psychological harm, as
opposed to arguing that the proposed witness was too mentally ill to testify, clearly
broadened the existing interpretation of the "then existing mental illness and
infirmity" clause of FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(4). See supra note 42. Plaintiff's attempt to
have the child declared unavailable when the process, and not just an appearance at
trial, causes the child psychological harm seems a further reasonable application of the
policies expressed in FED. R. EviD. 102 as applied to FED. R. EviD. 804(a)(4).
49. FED. R. CIrv. P. 32(a)(3)(E) has a nice, open-textured phrasing that is amenable
to an argument that asks the court to take a novel position: "[U]pon application and
notice, that such exceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the interest
of justice and with due regard to the importance of presenting the testimony of
witnesses orally in open court, to allow the deposition to be used." FED. R. CIV. P.
32(a)(3)(E).
Words like "interest of justice" provide an ideal vocabulary for asking a court to
go beyond the existing bounds of doctrinal interpretation. Also, plaintiff may be
reluctant to attempt to squeeze an argument into 804(a). See supra notes 47, 48.
Indeed, courts may well feel some discomfort expanding the scope of unavailability
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under 804(a) when to do so would ease the admission of both reliable and unreliable
804 exceptions.
FED. R. CIrv. P. 32(a), on the other hand, deals only with depositions. There are
two problems in invoking FED. R. CIrv. P. 32(a)(3)(E), however. The phrase
"exceptional circumstances" provides the first problem. "Exceptional" could be
equated with "necessary" and thus undermine the "good cause" analysis. See supra
note 20. Certainly, something about the particular case must distinguish it from the
routine. A requirement of uniqueness would require that the moving party present
good cause to believe that there is something significantly different about the
particular case that merits special treatment. This requirement itself raises problems.
If courts admit videotaped depositions into evidence, will not findings of unavailability
be relatively routine and therefore, by our own definition, be not exceptional?
Arguably, this analysis confuses how we treat a category of litigants with how we
treat members of that category. Hence, as is germane for our purposes, a court may
find the category of young sexual child abuse victims in the civil process to be an
"exceptional" class of litigants and still approach findings of unavailability as relatively
routine once a child is found to fall within the class.
The second problem of invoking the exceptional circumstances exception has
already been referred to briefly. FED. R. Civ. P. 32 appears to focus upon the physical
unavailability of the person rather than on the unavailability of his testimony. See
supra note 32. In child sexual abuse cases, however, the children can come into court;
the plaintiff is merely arguing that the court should not force them. The very few
cases decided under FED. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3)(E) and its predecessor, FED. R. Civ. P.
26(d)(3), do not clearly aid plaintiff's position. Most smack of physical unavailability:
Huff v. Marine Tank Testing Corp., 631 F.2d 1140, 1142-43 (4th Cir. 1980) (witnesses
promise to come and then fail to show up); Reber v. General Motors Corp., 669 F.
Supp. 717, 720 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (witnesses are expected by all concerned to be out-of-
state at the time of trial and unexpectedly return); Odell v. Miller, 10 F.R.D. 528, 529
(W.D. Mich., 1950) (witnesses flee their state of residence where the trial is being held
and refuse to reenter because they would be "arrested under a warrant or attachment"
from a local court); Stremel v. Sterling, 564 P.2d 559 (Kan. Ct. App. 1977) (witnesses
are subpoenaed, but do not show up for trial).
Note, however, that the court could have made the witness in Reber, a doctor,
testify. Rather, the court placed heavy emphasis on the "Doctor's busy schedule of
surgery." Reber, 669 F. Supp. 717. A busy schedule does not really constitute physical
unavailability. Similarly, another court used the exceptional circumstances exception
to admit a deposition taken out of the jury's presence, though the witness was clearly
available, in order to "expedite the trial" and "avoid confusion of the jury by
introduction of irrelevant testimony." Lebeck v. William A. Jarvis, Inc., 145 F. Supp.
706, 724 (E.D. Pa. 1956), rev'd, 250 F.2d 285 (3rd Cir. 1957).
Even though many of these cases appear to involve a lack of physical presence, at
no time did any of these courts make any pronouncement that the scope of FED. R.
Civ. P. 32(a)(3)(E) or its predecessor was limited to problems of literal physical
unavailability. The judges merely decided the cases before them.
It is surely not unreasonable to read FED. R. CIV. P. 32(a)(3)(E) as empowering the
court with discretion to deal with those situations not explicitly covered by FED. R.
Civ. P. 32(a)(3)(A)-(D). In fact, as one of the first courts to interpret the predecessor
of this section noted, "The quoted rule shows by its terms the solicitude disclosed in
the rules generally for trials on oral testimony and the disposition to avoid trial on
depositions alone where it can properly be avoided or where injustice or unfairness
will not result." Klepal v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 229 F.2d 610, 612 (2d Cir. 1956)
(emphasis added).
Although physical unavailability is certainly a situation where the less desirable
alternative of presenting deposition over live testimony cannot "properly be avoided,"
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the deposition as one to perpetuate testimony.50
In conclusion, several factors suggest that videotaped depo-
sitions will be admitted in civil child sexual abuse suits. First,
the court system is emotionally predisposed in the child's
favor.5 ' Second, the court system is dealing with evidentiary
other less defined grounds can fall under "unfair." As plaintiff's counsel would argue,
"Is it just or fair to make a child who has already suffered deeply suffer further when
nothing really is gained by making her stay in the process?"
50. FED. R. Civ. P. 27(c) provides, "[t]his rule does not limit the power of a court
to entertain an action to perpetuate testimony." Under this rule, the court retains the
former equity power of courts to perpetuate testimony. Shore v. ACandS, Inc., 644
F.2d 386, 389 (5th Cir. 1981). Courts have exercised this power when no other means
were available to save testimony which otherwise might be lost. See Arizona v.
California, 292 U.S. 341, 348 (1933).
Some literalists may have difficulty applying the concept of perpetuating
testimony to the grounds of trauma from being in the process. To such people,
perpetuation implies that there is a risk that the testimony will be lost unless it is
recorded. Specifically, the witness may leave the jurisdiction or may die.
The ground for finding unavailability in child sexual abuse cases does not really
carry the sense of loss by absence or death. There is not really a risk that the child
will be physically unavailable at the time trial starts. In some sense, to see this ground
as one akin to the type of physical unavailability that underlies the traditional
deposition to perpetuate testimony begs the question. In other words, the child will
only be unavailable if the court makes the legal determination that the child does not
have to attend the trial. On the other hand, unavailability under FED. R. EviD. 804 was
expanded beyond the concept of the witness being physically or mentally unavailable
to the situation where the desire for the witness's testimony was balanced against the
potential physical harm to the witness from attending. See supra note 42 and
accompanying text. It would not be a terrible stretch to carry the same analysis into
FED. R. Civ. P. 27.
Note that if the court designates the deposition as one to perpetuate testimony, a
contemporaneous decision on competence will be required because one of the
prerequisites to preserving testimony under this equity power is a showing that the
testimony "will be competent evidence." Arizona v. California, 292 U.S. 341, 348
(1933).
51. The defendant will likely have already pled guilty or been convicted of
criminal charges at the time of the civil suit. The judge will therefore believe that the
child was molested by the defendant.
If the defendant has not pled guilty, charges have not been filed, or a conviction is
on direct appeal, the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights will affect the progress of
the civil suit. First, most courts will not penalize a defendant who raises the Fifth
Amendment in answering a complaint or in responding to discovery. See, e.g., National
Acceptance Co. v. Bathalter, 705 F.2d 924, 926-27 (7th Cir. 1983); Note, Use of the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Civil Litigation, 52 VIRG. L. REV. 322, 331-32
(1966) [hereinafter Note, Self-Incrimination]. The court may penalize the defendant if
he raises the privilege in conjunction with an affirmative defense because this puts the
defendant in a position somewhat analogous to the plaintiff who cannot raise the Fifth
Amendment without facing the risk that his case will be dismissed. Note, Se-
Incrimination, supra, at 332. Further, unlike the criminal defendant, the civil
defendant has no right to refuse to take the stand. If he takes the Fifth Amendment
on cross-examination, he will be penalized in various ways from striking his direct
testimony, Annest v. Annest, 49 Wash. 2d 62, 64, 298 P.2d 483, 484 (1956), to permitting
adverse comment to the jury, Ikeda v. Curtis, 43 Wash. 2d 449, 459, 261 P.2d 684, 690
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preferences rather than constitutional norms. Furthermore,
videotaped depositions do not seem to prejudice the defend-
ant. 2 Finally, the court is armed with an extensive arsenal of
legal categories of unavailability predicated on factual findings
and on necessarily broad discretion in assessing the legal signif-
icance of those findings.' All considered, the courts will likely
routinely accept the arguments for the admission of videotaped
depositions.
B. The Relevance of a Prior Criminal Prosecution
Assuming that the arguments for the admission of video-
taped depositions are accepted, it may seem, from first impres-
sions, that efforts to gain admission of depositions will be
(1953). Cf Morris v. McClellan, 45 So. 641, 645 (Ala. 1908) (plaintiff may comment to
jury on defendant's refusal to answer certain interrogatories). Courts do not, however,
find a waiver of the privilege corresponding to the scope of direct examination. Note,
Sef-Incrimination, supra, at 328. This lack of waiver is presumably because a civil
defendant has no choice about testifying. For an argument that all of the burdens on a
claim of constitutionally-based privilege are unconstitutional, see Note, Self-
Incrimination, supra, at 335-41.
In light of the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights, one might expect a court to
liberally treat a defense motion that seeks a continuance until the criminal case is
over. This continuance could be for a long time and would perhaps add to the
plaintiff's arguments seeking early release of the child from the process.
52. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. The defendant may also actually
achieve more probing cross-examination in the intimate environment of a deposition.
Cf. Paula E. & Samuel M. Hill, Note, Videotaping Children's Testimony: An
Empirical View, 85 MICH. L. REv. 809, 809 (1987). The child will probably also have
less impact on tape than if the jury saw him or her live. See Lucy Berliner, The Child
Witness: The Progress and Emerging Limitations, in ABA REPORT, supra note 7, at
101; Note, Legislative Innovations, supra note 7, at 816.
53. Once a finding of unavailability is made, an unresolved question remains. May
plaintiff's counsel subsequently exercise the option to present the child's live
testimony at trial? From another perspective, when, if ever, should the court rule that
plaintiff is estopped from making this choice? To present the child's live testimony
after a finding of unavailability, plaintiff's counsel should be required to make at least
some showing of changed circumstances as well as a lack of prejudice to the defendant.
If the plaintiff can make such a showing, why cannot the defendant? If we permit
the defendant this option, serious consequences follow. For example, if the court
found the child unavailable long before trial, in theory the defense would have almost
endless opportunities to return to court for evidentiary hearings to demonstrate that
the child should not currently be found unavailable. To allow the defendant such
opportunities would begin unraveling the very objectives that led to finding the child
unavailable in the first place. Yet, it seems hard to avoid this result unless we can
distinguish the plaintiff's position from that of the defense. The positions can be
distinguished on the ground that, although allowing the defense the possibility of
reopening the issue may harm the child by making his or her release from the process
continually uncertain, allowing plaintiff's counsel this option cannot harm the child
because the option will only be exercised when those loyal to the child have
determined that no harm will result.
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unnecessary in civil suits because the child will not need to tes-
tify anyway. After all, with rare exceptions, a prior criminal
plea or conviction will proceed the civil suit. This prior plea or
conviction appears to constitute a collateral bar on relitigating
the issue of whether the defendant molested the child and
therefore obviates the need for the child's testimony.
However, this is unlikely to be the result in most child
molestation suits. In contrast to the federal court system
where a prior criminal conviction constitutes issue preclusion
in a subsequent civil proceeding, 4 a prior criminal conviction
in most state courts does not even constitute issue preclusion
as to identical issues.m Because the vast majority of civil sex-
ual abuse cases will arise in state and not federal court, the
plaintiff will generally not have the benefit of collateral
estoppel.
In states where issue preclusion is inapplicable in these
circumstances, the defendant's prior experience with the crimi-
nal process may be admitted at trial. Indeed, some states allow
the conviction to be admitted as "some evidence."' Others
admit it as "prima facie" evidence57 or as evidence admissible
under the state equivalent of Fed. R. Evid. 803(22).5" Still
others admit a plea as a party admission 59 or as an admission
against interest.6°
Why then will the prior conviction not be sufficient to pro-
vide the plaintiff with all the evidence needed on the issue of
molestation and therefore obviate the need for the child's testi-
mony? Surely, when a civil jury hears about a prior criminal
plea, or a conviction at a criminal trial, it will have no problem
finding that the molestation took place. In fact, this evidence
is likely to be more conclusively persuasive of molestation
54. See Emich Motors Co. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558, 568-69 (1951);
Comptom v. Ide, 732 F.2d 1429, 1434 (9th Cir. 1984).
55. See, e.g., Nell v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 427 So. 2d 798, 800
n.3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
56. See, e.g., Weichhand v. Garlinger, 447 S.W.2d 606, 610 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969).
57. See, e.g., O'Dell v. Dowd, 429 N.E.2d 548, 551 (11. App. Ct. 1981). Cf. Ross v.
Lawson, 395 A.2d 54, 55-56 (D.C. 1978).
58. "Evidence of a final judgment, entered after a trial or upon a plea of guilty...
adjudging a person guilty of a crime punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of
one year, to prove any fact essential to sustain the judgment. FED. R. EVID.
803(22) (Judgment of Previous Conviction) (emphasis added).
59. See, e.g., Roper v. Scott, 48 S.E.2d 118, 121 (Ga. Ct. App. 1949).
60. See, e.g., McCottrell v. Benson, 178 N.E.2d 144, 145 (Ill. App. Ct. 1961); Nell v.
International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 427 So. 2d 798, 800 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
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than, for example, a six-year-old's rambling testimony covering
the same matter.
The admission of prior pleas or convictions, however, does
not simply eliminate the need for the child to testify. The
problem is two-fold. First, because we are talking about the
use of the prior plea or trial verdict as mere evidence, and not
as a procedural bar to even raising the issue, the issue of
molestation is still in play. This means that the defendant can
still call the child to the stand regarding the issue of sexual
abuse. But why would the defense do that? Surely as a tacti-
cal matter, the last thing that defense counsel would want to
do is call before the jurors an innocent child whom his or her
client has been found guilty by a jury of, or admitted to,
molesting.
Although this reasoning makes sense, the point is that
regardless of the wisdom of actually calling the child to the
stand, the defendant's counsel can threaten to call the child to
the stand. This threat is a significant one; parent and child
concern about the child having to testify in court is frequently
a serious impediment to the initial filing of a civil complaint
and to the carrying of that complaint to its conclusion.
Even if one questions the decency of a defense attorney
who would exploit such a threat, one will be hard pressed to
find an ethical violation. The threat is a by-product of the nor-
mal functioning of the litigation process: civil plaintiffs may be
called to the stand by their adversaries. It will not be easy to
claim that opposing counsel has crossed the bounds of ethical
conduct.
Ethical violations will be especially hard to prove because
the defense attorney is unlikely to say anything like "I am
going to put that kid on the stand and make his life hell unless
you drop this case or settle for peanuts." Rather, counsel
merely will be noncommittal: "I really can't say at this point
that we will not call the child to the stand. I'd rather not put
the child through that if it can be avoided, but it may be neces-
sary. Some of it depends upon how things play out in the rest
of the discovery and our eventual strategy, and I'm not at lib-
erty to discuss my strategy with you. I'm sure you understand
that would be a betrayal of my duties of advocacy and confi-
dentiality to my client." Thus, the trial court's admission of a
defendant's prior plea or conviction does not eliminate defense
counsels' ethical use of child testimony.
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Second, even in a jurisdiction where collateral estoppel
applies and the litigation of the molestation issue is barred,
there are a number of reasons why the child may still need to
take the stand at trial. First, collateral estoppel bars only
defendants and those in privity with the defendant."' The
main defendant in the actual case, however, may be a daycare
owner whom the plaintiff is claiming negligently hired or
supervised employees. The main defendant may also be a state
licensing agency that has allegedly inadequately investigated a
daycare in issuing a license or in examining a subsequent
complaint.
In addition, reliance on collateral estoppel may be of no
avail in multiple-count criminal cases, such as a daycare situa-
tion where a number of children have been molested. If the
defendant has entered into a plea bargain, the plea will likely
be to one or two counts in exchange for a number of the other
counts being dismissed. Consequently, in a subsequent civil
case, those children whose cases were dismissed in the plea
will not be able to claim collateral estoppel.
Further, collateral estoppel bars relitigation of the "identi-
cal issues" only.62 Thus, although a plea or conviction at a
criminal trial would bar relitigating the issue of molestation, a
number of other issues may exist in the civil case that are not
encompassed within the criminal conviction and about which
the child may need to testify. For example, as part of a case
based upon negligent supervision, the child may need to
describe who was where and when things took place. Without
this testimony, plaintiff may lack sufficient evidence to prove
that a particular daycare was improperly run.
As another example of issues requiring child testimony,
the child's testimony may be relevant on the extent of the
defendant's insurance coverage. In this regard, suppose that a
defendant molested a single child repeatedly over the course of
a year. The defendant will likely be charged with only a single
count of molestation in a complaint alleging, for example,
"Between November 6, 1989 and December 1, 1990, the defend-
ant .... ." Any plea or jury verdict in such a case will result
only in a single conviction. Insurance policies, however, gener-
61. Tomlinson v. Lafkowitz, 334 F.2d 262, 264 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
962 (1965).
62. See Emich Motors Co. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558, 564 (1951); Hyslop
v. United States, 261 F.2d 786, 790 (8th Cir. 1959).
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ally pay per "occurrence."6 3 Because the insurance company
will be the only practical source to satisfy a damage award in
most sexual abuse cases,' the extent of the company's liability
will be a significant issue for the plaintiff. After all, the princi-
pal reason to bring a civil suit is to get money. No doubt coun-
sel for the plaintiff and counsel for the insurance company in
our hypothetical will argue over whether repeated molestation
is "one continuous" or "a discrete number of separate" occur-
rences. In the likely event that the court finds each molesta-
tion a separate "occurrence," information as to the number of
separate molestations will likely have to be supplied by the
child.65
In conclusion, although at first blush a criminal defend-
ant's prior plea or conviction would seem to be a collateral bar
on the molestation issue in a civil suit, such a conclusion is not
necessarily true in the state courts. Even if a trial court admits
a prior plea or conviction into evidence in a civil suit, the child
victim may still have to testify. This is because defense counsel
may need to call the child. Additionally, plaintiff's counsel
may call the child for reasons of defendant privity, multiple-
count criminal cases, or other issues requiring child testimony.
If the child's testimony is required, videotaped depositions
become a viable alternative to live testimony for the reasons
previously discussed.
63. In most homeowners or comprehensive general liability policies, you will find
language such as, "The Company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the
insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damage because of personal injury...
caused by an occurrence." Noel McKibbin, Note, Defending Sexual Molestation
Claims Under A Comprehensive General Liability Policy: Issues of Scope, Occurrence,
and Expert Witness Testimony, 39 DRAKE L. REV. 477, 499 n.154 (1989-90) (citations
omitted).
"[An] [o]ccurrence is defined as an accident including continuous or repeated
exposure to conditions, which result in bodily injury... neither expected nor intended
from the standpoint of the insured." Id. at 495 (citations omitted).
64. See infra Section III-C.
65. The child's testimony might be required on the issue of damages. This is less
likely, however, than the necessity of testimony regarding the number of separate
molestations. Although the damages case may have more impact if the jury is exposed
to the child throughout the trial rather than just through a video tape, it is difficult to
imagine a great number of cases where the child's testimony on the issue of damages is
truly needed.
In addition to the testimony of relatives, teachers, and others who can describe
changes in the child's behavior in some detail, the child's story will be told to the jury
through the testimony of a mental health expert. The child's hearsay statements
probably will be admissible as forming part of the basis for the expert's opinion on the
nature and extent of emotional harm. See FED. R. EVID. 703.
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III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF ADMIITING VIDEOTAPED
DEPOSITIONS
A. A Brief Exploration of the Broader, Systemic Implications
Most of this Article is concerned with the eventual impli-
cations of admitting videotaped depositions upon the interests
of abused children. As already discussed, in suits seeking com-
pensation for sexually abused children, video depositions are
unlikely to prejudice civil defendants.6 In fact, the defense
may fare better without the live presence of the child victim.
But routine acceptance of the reasons for the admission of
videotaped depositions has broader potential consequences that
transcend the particular arena of child sexual abuse cases.
From the macro-perspective, changes in evidentiary rules
are not likely to create significant changes in our society and
culture. As we have seen, other forces such as economics,
human psychology, and institutional behavior act as powerful
constraints on such possibilities.67 However, such evidentiary
changes will affect the legal system. Whatever one thinks
about the notion of law as a "seamless web," changes in one
part of the law tend to affect other parts of the law rather like
unraveling a thread.6 Here, the thread offered by accepting
the reasons for the admission of videotaped depositions could,
in the absence of care, ultimately loosen our commitment to
live testimony at civil trials.
Thus, one consequence of accepting the evidentiary argu-
ments for the admission of videotaped depositions is that such
acceptance carries the seeds of destruction for a fundamental
operating principle of our litigation system: the preference for
live testimony.69 The reasons for the admission of videotaped
depositions would seem to apply to all children who underwent
traumatic experiences whether from sexual abuse or some
frightening accident. Given this, the rationales should seem-
ingly also apply to any child witness who can make the proper
showing.
Taking the argument one step further, some may argue
that testifying in open court at trial could be harmful to cer-
66. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
67. The law, however, can also serve as an influence and constraint on these
forces.
68. The law's threadlike nature is particularly true given that we entrust so much
of our reasoning methodology to analogy.
69. See supra note 17.
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tain adults, such as those who were raped or who witnessed
some horrible accident, or who were the victims of sexual dis-
crimination. Why should they not be let out of the process if
they make some "good cause" showing that testifying in court
could be too traumatic? If we allow this, we have seemingly
embarked on a path leading to trial by video.7°
Trial by video, however, is not an inevitable result of
accepting the reasons for the admission of videotaped testi-
mony in child sexual abuse cases. Whether the potential sweep
of the arguments will be confined to cases of child sexual
abuse first depends upon how "good" courts will require good
cause to be. Although individual judges may vary, this stan-
dard has previously provided enough resistance to prevent liti-
gants from moving too easily through passages at which the
judges were gatekeepers.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) provides for the issuance of protective
orders upon a showing of good cause.7 ' In applying this stan-
dard, courts place the "burden ... upon the movant to show
the necessity of its issuance, which contemplates 'a particular
and specific demonstration of fact, as distinguished from stere-
otyped and conclusory statements' ... "72 Any attorney who
has tried to obtain a protective order from a federal judge in
discovery knows that this language has real bite in practice.
One can obtain protective orders with the proper showing, but
they are far from routinely exercised prerogatives.73
Furthermore, words do not exist in a vacuum. Words are
mediated through an interrelationship between cultural, per-
sonal, and historical contexts. Currently, we understand that
psychological harm to sexually abused children might often be
exacerbated by the trial process. Judges will likely possess this
understanding when assessing the good cause showings. They
will also know that, although we tend to characterize a three-
year-old and a sixteen-year-old as "children," they do not nec-
70. Trial by video may be inevitable in any event considering the current
acceptance of video transcripts in the place of stenographic ones. Martha Freedman,
In Camera Proceedings, 10 CAL. LAw. 26 (Nov. 1990).
71. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
72. General Dynamics Corp. v. Selb Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 1204, 1212 (8th Cir.), cert
denied, 414 U.S. 1162 (1974) (citation omitted).
73. The seriousness with which courts take "good cause" is in fact implicitly
illustrated by the removal of that standard from FED. R. Civ. P. 34 in 1970 so that
document discovery would be brought in line with the far more liberal standard of
"reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence" found in FED.
R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). See FED. R. CIv. P. 34 advisory committee notes.
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essarily belong in the same category. Although a judge may
routinely find good cause for unavailability when younger chil-
dren are involved, the finding may not be so automatic when
an older teenager asks to be excused from trial.7 4
The same reluctance to find good cause applies to adults
who attempt to get out of the process. Unless the judge is sim-
ply looking for any excuse to sanction trial by video, an adult
will bear a heavy burden in convincing the court that trial is so
harmful to the adult's emotional health that the court should
excuse him or her from testifying other than in a deposition.
Courts will be acutely aware of the difference between a trial
being an unpleasant experience as opposed to one which truly
risks an adult's physical or mental health.
Additionally, a judge is likely to feel that a defense attor-
ney can obtain far more useful information cross-examining an
adult in front of a jury than the attorney could from cross-
examining a young child. For example, we are comfortable
drawing inferences from the demeanor of adults under the cru-
cible of cross-examination. But we are not so comfortable
drawing the same inferences if a five-year-old squirms and
looks down when being cross-examined. For this reason,
courts will hesitate to apply anything but a stringent test of
good cause to a claim seeking to have an adult party or witness
found unavailable.
Thus, the admission of videotaped depositions in child sex-
ual abuse cases presents understandable concerns about the
elimination of live testimony at trial. However, the admission
of child depositions in these cases is unlikely to unleash a tor-
rent of videotaped depositions of non-parties in other contexts.
This is because any finding of "unavailability" will require a
showing of good cause. The difficulty in making a good cause
showing, the intuition of judges, and the rare instances of harm
to adults in testifying suggest that courts will rarely find good
cause for the admission of videotaped depositions in lieu of live
testimony.
B. How Releasing a Child From Testifying at Trial Will
Affect the Behavior of the Various Interested Players
If courts routinely admit videotaped depositions into evi-
dence, the child will not have to testify at trial and may even
74. Note that, generally, child sexual abuse victims in daycares will tend to be
younger children.
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be out of the process at a very early stage following a deposi-
tion.75 The following discussion explores how this might affect
the various interested players in the process: children, parents
or guardians, defense attorneys, and plaintiff attorneys.
1. The Child and the Child's Parents or Guardians
Understandably, parents and guardians often hesitate to
put their children through the trauma of testifying at a crimi-
nal trial.7 6 One might be cynical and posit that the promise of
a large financial reward through a civil suit may change these
adults' views about putting their darlings through the trauma
of trial. After all, the civil process deals with money whereas
the criminal process appeals to the desire for justice, the pro-
tection of other children, and the call to civic duty.
While I will not deny that the cynical view may describe
some adults, I do not believe that it describes very many. The
thought of putting a child who has been sexually abused
through the strain of trial,7 7 especially if the child has already
gone through the criminal process, is likely to make most par-
ents feel that the physical, mental, and emotional cost of fur-
ther litigation outweighs the benefit of immersing their child
in further litigation. The child, of course, will not be as young
by the time the civil case actually gets to trial. The aging of
the child, however, will probably make such a trial even more
traumatic because with age generally comes additional self-
awareness. The child may not want to have a constant
reminder of the sexual abuse hanging over his or her head for
years to come and may not relish facing the continual specter
of that day when the child must walk into a courtroom, take
the stand, go through every gruesome detail again, and then
face cross-examination. 8
75. See supra notes 29-53 and accompanying text for a discussion regarding child
unavailability due to the trauma of being "in the process."
76. Romanoff, supra note 6, at 921-22.
77. But see opinions of some experts that many children do not find testifying at
trial difficult. See supra note 7.
78. The pressure that facing trial puts on plaintiffs is obviously exacerbated when
the trial focuses on a traumatic event:
General M. Stern, the Arnold & Porter attorney who orchestrated the case
for plaintiffs, describes how his concern for the psychological well-being of his
clients affected his decision to settle the case in his book entitled The Buffalo
Creek Disaster.
I knew there were some major disadvantages to the plaintiffs in having to
go through a lengthy and harrowing trial. This made me wonder again
whether any settlement that did not air all Pittston's wrongdoing in a public
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Even if the child does not object to the initial lawsuit
being filed, the child or parents may raise objections over time.
Indeed, filing a lawsuit does not really involve the child
because an attorney merely sends a piece of paper to another
attorney. As the trial nears, however, the child or parents may
perceive the reality of child testimony and balk at
participating.
If the courts readily admit videotaped depositions, the situ-
ation changes. The child will have to testify at a deposition
and not at a trial. Limiting a child's participation to deposi-
tional testimony, however, will affect the participants' behavior
only if facing a deposition carries less trauma and foreboding
than testifying at trial.
Is a deposition really less traumatizing and foreboding
than testimony at a trial? One could contend that depositions
are even worse than trials because defense counsel has far
more latitude in questioning and, without the presence of a
judge, can be even more abusive than in court. Also, to the
extent that the focus of the case shifts to depositions, one
could argue that it brings the dreaded event closer to the date
of initiating the case. Under such circumstances, parents may
be even less willing to bring these suits. After all, it is one
thing when a potential trial is three years away and "probably
will not happen anyway because the defendants will surely set-
tle" and quite another when a potential deposition is around
the corner. Further, the child will likely be at an earlier stage
of therapy and, accordingly, be more psychologically vulnera-
ble than might be the case years later when the child is both
older and far more advanced in the therapy process. Although
these arguments have some plausibility, none is ultimately
convincing.
Initially, even if giving evidence at a deposition and at a
trial were really the same, most of us do not see the two exper-
iences as equivalent. The image of trial is deeply embedded in
our cultural awareness while the image of depositions are not.
Most plaintiffs will respond to this image of trial.
In fact, the distinction between the two proceedings is well
trial could possibly be in the best interest of all those who had suffered for so
many years at the hands of the coal companies. On the other hand, a public
trial would certainly not be in the best interest of the plaintiffs, who would
have to be paraded up, one by one, in front of the jury and in front of the
press to tell all their psychiatric problems.
Parker, supra note 6, at 659 (notes omitted).
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justified. The formality and symbolism of the courtroom is
extremely intimidating. Individuals who enter into the area
occupied by judge, jury, and often several attorneys feel this
intimidation. Also, the courtroom is a vast, often imposing,
space not at all like a small conference room where depositions
take place.
Although it is true that defense attorneys can, in theory,
be just as, if not more, abusive in depositions than in formal
court, there are a number of reasons why attorneys will not be
abusive in a deposition. First, as a tactical matter, defense
counsel will generally try to make it seem that she and the
child are just conversing. Second, the child's attorney can stop
the deposition and seek court protection. Third, the defense
will be extremely hesitant to overstep the appropriate bounds
because the deposition is on videotape and therefore packaged
in real time rather than on a paper record. This hesitance will
be especially true considering that the entire procedure has
been set up to protect the child from the trauma that often
accompanies trial. Also, because this is a civil case, a variety of
measures can be taken to make the atmosphere less disturbing
to the child. In the proper case, defense counsel can probably
be kept out of the deposition room altogether by having a
judge7" or mental health professional8' ask questions submitted
by counsel. The defendant can also be kept out of the deposi-
tion room if his or her presence would overly disturb the
child."'
By taking the child out of the litigation process once the
deposition is completed,82 the child's life can continue without
79. Cf. e.g., In re James A., 505 A.2d 1386, 1389 (R.I. 1986) (judge questions).
80. In a case reported in the New York Times, a judge ordered that a three-year-
old victim of an abduction have her testimony taken by a psychiatrist. Questions were
posed by the judge, prosecution, and defense counsel who were standing behind a one-
way window and were repeated by the psychiatrist who heard the questions over an
earphone. N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1986, at C-1.
81. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(c)(5) empowers the court to make a protective order for
"good cause" that "discovery be conducted with no one present except persons
designated by the court." See, e.g., Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 996 (2d Cir. 1973)
(plaintiff photographer who had history of harassing defendant not permitted at
defendant's deposition). Cf. also, In re Mary S., 230 Cal. Rptr. 726, 727 (Cal. App. 1986)
(father not permitted to be in room with children testifying in dependency hearing); In
re Katrina L., 247 Cal. Rptr. 754, 759 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (father not permitted to be in
room with children testifying at dependency hearing).
82. Unless the court finds the child unavailable on the "trauma from the process"
theory, there will be a hearing on unavailability near trial. This could involve an
interview of the child by the court with some questions by counsel and/or declarations
from mental health experts and family.
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the fear of courtroom testimony and its constant reminder of
the child's experience. To be sure, the parents will still be
involved in the case, but their involvement will make the case
something that vaguely exists in the background; there will be
a letter from an attorney here and an overheard fragment of a
conversation there. Under these circumstances, parents and
children should be much more willing to bring these suits.
8 3
83, Espousing a variant on the notion of litigation as catharsis, some have offered
the theory that carrying a civil case to a conclusion can help counter the
psychologically destructive state of powerlessness from which incest victims often
suffer. See, e.g., Margaret J. Allen, Comment, Tort Remedies For Incestuous Abuse, 13
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 609, 617 nn.53 & 55 (1983). To the extent that acceptance of
the arguments for unavailability leads to more cases being brought, "empowerment"
should become more prevalent. As generally put forth, the theory of empowerment
rests on three assumptions: (1) in the criminal process, the state and not the child
confronts the father with the child remaining in a subordinate role just like at home;
(2) by the time most children file civil suit they will be adults living away from home;
and (3) at this stage of his or her life, the child has little need for the protection from
his or her father that criminal prosecution offers but can benefit from payment for his
or her injuries. See, e.g., id. at 617 n.55.
Although the theory of empowerment has certain appeal, the theory is
problematic when viewed in the context of the legal reasons for releasing the "child"
from the litigation trial process. First, the proponents of the empowerment theory
focus on cases of incest and particularly those cases in which the child is now much
older. Even if empowerment takes place in those cases, it is not clear that it will work
equally well when the transgressor is a babysitter or an employee of a daycare, let
alone when the only defendant in court is the owner of a daycare or members of the
state licensing agency who have been accused of negligence. Furthermore, the
possibility of empowerment does not have equal force if the child is still young.
Second, the criminal process has far more clearly labeled the molester as "bad"
than the civil process ever will. That, in fact, is the essence of the criminal process.
Thus, having the state on the plaintiff's side in a criminal prosecution would
seemingly give the child victim a tremendous sense of power and vindication.
Additionally, in general, the plaintiff will be as subordinate to the civil litigator
conducting the case as she was to the prosecutor as a young child. This might be even
more so given the fact that much of the case will likely not involve the plaintiff-
defendant relationship at all but rather focus on the conduct of some daycare
supervisor or members of some state licensing agencies.
Third, the plaintiff in a civil suit will not have the satisfaction of looking eyeball to
eyeball with the deviant family member in front of a jury if the evidentiary reasons for
admitting the video deposition are accepted. Plaintiffs will have their deposition
taken, and they will be involved no more. But see supra note 82, regarding the
possibility that the child may have to appear at a hearing near the time of trial to
determine "unavailability." Thereafter his or her interaction with the case will be
more akin to one who has made an application for money and now awaits the result in
the mail.
Fourth, whatever participation the plaintiff has will not necessarily be all that
positive. This is a civil case, and damages will become an issue. See McKibbin, supra
note 63, at 480, 489. Much of the cross-examination at the deposition and/or trial will
be directed at bringing out information about damages. The defense attorney will
often make it painfully clear to the plaintiff that the attorney intends to argue that the
plaintiff is exaggerating the extent of damages in a calculated performance of
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2. The Defense Attorney
Based upon my own work and conversations with civil liti-
gators in the field, defense attorneys are acutely aware of
plaintiffs' reticence at putting the child through the trauma of
trial. The attorneys realize, or at least believe, that even if a
civil child sexual abuse case is filed, the plaintiff may drop the
case or settle for a relatively low sum in order to avoid trial as
the day of trial approaches. This knowledge is significant lev-
erage and makes it rational for the defense attorney to wait
long into the process before considering settlement. Because
we are generally talking about very large damage claims, even
the expense of full discovery and attorney time is small com-
pared to the potential damage award avoided if the plaintiffs
voluntarily dismiss or gravely reduce their demands.
Make no mistake, however, defense attorneys are not vil-
lains in this game. Even as representatives of child molesters,
they are aware that, as the saying goes, these types of charges
are easily brought and difficult to refute."' This perception is
compounded by the fact that improperly conducted interviews
with the child can dramatically bias the child's perceptions and
truthfulness.' Although most of these cases will follow crimi-
nal prosecution, defense counsel may still believe that her cli-
ent was wrongly convicted and that the civil suit only
continues the injustice. Further, even if counsel believes that
her client molested the child, the issue of appropriate damages
still exists. All defense counsel I have spoken with agree with-
out hestitation that child molestation is despicable. The nature
of the act, however, does not mean that the plaintiff is entitled
to be rich for life.
Moreover, in reality, defense attorneys often represent a
daycare owner or a state agency rather than the child
molester. In this context, defense attorneys are particularly
unmitigated greed. Moreover, in an incest situation, the plaintiff's vindication may be
at the expense of others he or she cares about. As we will see, the only source
generally available for compensating the victim in child sexual abuse cases will be the
private assets of the defendant. These assets, such as they exist, will likely be
intertwined with the entire family's finances. To the extent that there are other
family members the plaintiff cares about dependent on these finances, the sensation of
victory may again not be that pure.
Last, of course, is what perhaps should have been said first. The empowerment
theory assumes that there is someone who can pay the damages and, as we will see,
such defendants are very few and extremely far between.
84. See McKibbin, supra note 63, at 485.
85. Id at 486, 502-07.
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sensitive to what they see as the almost innate instincts of the
plaintiff's attorney to look for the deep pockets and then to
create a theory to justify digging in. In other words, they see
equities on their side. They see a client who has totally legiti-
mate interests that they are there to protect.
If the courts routinely accept the evidentiary arguments
for unavailability, however, defense attorneys will know that
once the child has given a deposition, the plaintiff has its "wit-
ness" for trial. Because videotaped depositions take away
much of defense counsels' leverage, we can expect defense
counsel to make earlier, larger settlements.
3. The Plaintiff's Attorney
Plaintiffs cannot try their cases without an attorney who
will take it, and good attorneys are not that easy to find. As
discussed in the next section, few cases exist in the spectrum of
child sexual abuse cases in which the defendant, or rather the
defendant's insurance company,86 will have the resources to
satisfy a damage judgment. Generally, the cases that offer a
realistic possibility of compensation will involve negligent hir-
ing or supervision claims against a daycare or negligent licens-
ing claims against a state agency.
Although plaintiffs' attorneys will probably take these
cases at a contingent rate generous to the attorney, and they
can anticipate potentially high damage awards, attorneys might
hesitate to accept these cases. To begin with, child molestation
cases are not easy. Working with child witnesses is a special
skill that is not within the province of most tort litigator's abil-
ities. Further, the parents themselves may insist on joining as
plaintiffs, claiming damages for their own pain and suffering.
This leaves the plaintiff's attorney with the problem of keep-
ing the jury focused on the image of an innocent child who has
been hurt and at the same time keeping the defense attorney
from trying to refocus the case on the image of greedy adults
86. "The tort system allows for compensation to injured parties through lawsuits
and, far more importantly, through claims for resolution by liability insurance
companies. Indeed, of the millions of insurance claims filed each year, typically only
two percent are resolved through litigation." Robert E. Litan, et al., The US. Liability
System. Background and Trends, in LIABILITY: PERSPECTIVES AND PoLIcY 7 (Robert
E. Litan & Clifford Winston eds., 1988). "[J]ury awards represent only the tip of the
tort system and may not even accurately reflect the actual levels of compensation
received by plaintiffs." Id. at 7-8.
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trying to hit the jackpot."7 If the state is involved, plaintiffs'
attorneys may face claims of immunity,8 as well as drawn out,
complex discovery battles over governmental privilege when
counsel tries to get access to the state's records.8 9
Also, as is becoming the norm in civil litigation, these
cases will tend to be somewhat expensive. Depositions of
numerous daycare employees, children, and parents may be
involved. Experts will surely be needed; perhaps some experts
will be needed to work with the children throughout the entire
litigation process as well as be available to testify at trial on
everything from damages to the existence of sexual abuse syn-
drome.' Although the plaintiff will eventually be liable for
these costs out of the proceeds of any judgment, the attorney
will almost surely have to advance the expenses until then and
"eat" the expenses if the suit is not successful.
Finally, the plaintiff's attorney will weigh heavily the
alternative value of his or her time. Litigators are currently
billing between $100 and $200 dollars an hour and up. Those
whose practices principally rely upon contingent fees translate
their work into the same, if not far higher, billing rate. Under
these circumstances, the attorney will not be willing to expend
the type of effort that these cases require unless success seems
likely. The inference from this discussion is that if a plaintiff's
87. In a paradoxical twist on this theme, a judge dismissed criminal sexual assault
charges partly on the grounds that the child's parents and psychologists were biased by
the prospect of a $40 million civil suit that had been filed against the defendant. John
Gilie & Elaine Porterfield, Judge Throws Out All Charges in the Sortland Day-Care
Case, MORNING NEws TRIB. (Tacoma, Wash.), Nov. 28, 1990, at Al.
If the parents are plaintiffs their bias is clear. Not only does this allow for the
change in focus referred to above, but it may tend to impeach the parents as key
witnesses regarding their information that supports the child's case. Also, the defense
may be able to introduce a whole series of side issues regarding, for example, the
parents' knowledge and behavior, and argue that all this is relevant to possible
contributory negligence on the parents' part.
Parents may be important witnesses in these cases regarding a number of issues:
(1) damages, (2) circumstances from which one can infer molestation (i.e., change in
behavior of child), and (3) information that an expert can rely on in testifying
regarding damages and in offering an opinion that the child's behavior is consistent
with abuse. Even if the parents were not plaintiffs, the defendant would try to cross-
examine them on their financial interest. After all, the jury will understand that they
will have some control over an award given to, for example, a three-year-old.
88. See, e.g., Andrade v. Ellefson, 391 N.W.2d 836, 840 (Minn. 1986); Brasel v.
Children's Servs. Div., 642 P.2d 696, 698-99 (Or. Ct. App. 1982).
89. For an example of how complex and convoluted litigation against the
government can be, see Penn v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 57-61 (1987).
90. See McKibbin, supra note 63, at 502-07; Thomas R. Finn, Child Witness
Practice In Child Abuse Proceedings, 23 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 271, 318 (1989).
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attorney is going to commit to one of these cases, the attorney
does not want to think that the plaintiffs will back out mid-
stream or will try to encourage a "cheap" settlement. If either
of these things happen, the value of the attorney's considerable
time and efforts, as well as costs advanced,91 will be greatly
diminished, if not lost.
On the other hand, if videotaped depositions are routinely
admitted, plaintiffs' attorneys should be more willing to take
child sexual abuse cases because they will know the cases will
not fold. They also will know that the defense attorneys will
not have the leverage of the parents', and perhaps the child's,
desire not to go to trial. Once the attorney has the deposition,
the child as a witness is no longer an issue. The leverage in
bargaining shifts to the plaintiff. Plaintiff attorneys know that
defense attorneys, when forced to face the "reality" of the
child's testimony, will be more amenable to and more generous
in settlement.92
In conclusion, if the courts admit videotaped child testi-
mony and children are out of the process at the deposition
stage, the interested parties will be affected in different ways.
Children, parents, and guardians will be much more willing to
bring suits. Defense attorneys will be willing to make earlier
and larger settlements. Plaintiffs' attorneys will know that
defense attorneys are so inclined, and thus plaintiffs' attorneys
will be in a better bargaining position. Considering the interac-
tion between the parties, the result will be more civil child sex-
ual abuse suits with higher settlements and more judgments
for plaintiffs.
91. For example, under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, attorneys can
advance or guarantee "expenses of litigation," but only if "the client ultimately
remains liable" for these costs. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucr Rule
1.18(a)(3)(e) (1984). Not surprisingly, all attorneys I know make this clear in their
written agreements. Even without such written agreement, an attorney who is
discharged, which is in effect what would happen if the client refused to continue with
the case, can probably sue for both "expenses advanced" and "quantum meruit."
Lawyer's Manual on Professional Conduct (ABA/BNA) 801:3301 (Opinion 6 of the
1981 Indiana Bar Commission).
On the other hand, the reality may be that no attorney would want to sue the
parents of a sexually abused child who wanted out of the case because the child could
not emotionally continue.
92. From the standpoint of the mythical "wider" society, this result is a mixed
bag. More suits will likely be filed, raising the costs of the civil system that eventually
must be borne by taxpayers or come out of some other service budget. On the other
hand, to the extent the cases will be more likely to settle early, the cost of the process,
especially trial, will be reduced.
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C. Consequences of Admitting Child Videotape Depositions:
More Settlements and Judgments for Plaintiffs
As the last section indicates, if abused children are rou-
tinely found unavailable and their depositions are admitted in
place of their live testimony,93 more children and parents are
likely to file child sexual abuse cases. These cases tend to be
extremely sympathetic, so one can expect that many of these
cases will be settled in advance of trial. Those that do go to
trial are likely to result in verdicts for the plaintiff.
Generally, the fact of molestation will be a given, leaving
the jury only with questions concerning the "reasonableness"
of supervision, hiring, or some licensing process under some
negligence theory. In making this decision, it is not unlikely
that juries may be influenced by the uncontested reality that
an innocent child has been harmed.
Victorious cases are likely to result in relatively high dam-
age awards.94 These high damage awards receive publicity in
newspapers and are noted in various plaintiff attorney publica-
tions. Thus, a cycle is created. More civil plaintiffs will pursue
child sex abuse claims. More attorneys will take these cases.
Plaintiffs will achieve higher settlements as the promise of
high jury verdicts is further implanted in the public and pro-
fessional consciousness. In addition, plaintiffs will achieve
higher jury verdicts in cases that do go to trial. Completing
the cycle, higher settlements and jury verdicts will cause more
plaintiffs to pursue child sex abuse claims.
93. I have not discussed such devices as two-way video because their use still
envisions that the child will appear for trial, and I have only considered evidentiary
postures that result in effectively removing the child from the process. To the extent,
however, that in a particular case the reticence of plaintiff to go to trial stems, not
from a general aversion- to the child taking the stand, but from a fear of confronting
the molester, permitting the child to testify through a two-way video will accomplish
results analogous to substituting the video deposition. The point is that either
mechanism removes the source of plaintiff's reluctance to go to trial.
94. Six-figure verdicts, adding up to millions when several child victims are
involved, have been recorded. See, e.g., Dietmar Grellmann, Note, Insurance Coverage
For Child Sexual Abuse Under California Law: Should Intent to Harm Be Specifically
Proven or Imputed as A Matter of Law?, 18 Sw. U. L. REv. 171, 172 (1988); Allen, supra
note 83, at 618; McKibbin, supra note 63 at 478; State Shares Guilt In Abuse at
Daycare, TACOMA NEws TRIB. (Tacoma, Wash.), Mar. 25, 1988, at B1.
Tort reform legislation, to the extent that it puts a cap on general damages, might
effect the size of some child abuse verdicts. The impact of such legislation, however,
should not be overestimated for several reasons. First, many jurisdictions do not have
such legislation. Second, these cases still carry significant special damages. Third,
even those jurisdictions with tort reform legislation still cap general damages in six
figures. Fourth, these cases often involve multiple plaintiffs.
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Will the mere acceptance of child videotaped depositions
have such substantial results? I believe so. To make an
impact, the admission of testimony does not initially have to
affect a large volume of cases. The change must merely make
a handful of cases successful that would not have been success-
ful otherwise. Child sexual abuse cases are highly visible and
involve large sums of money. Each additional judgment or set-
tlement for a plaintiff may have significance for the process.
An increased willingness to bring these cases could result in
greater compensation for the child victims and greater deter-
rence of child sexual abuse. The following sections explore the
extent to which these possibilities might be realized.
1. Compensating the Victim
Because of the severe physical, psychological, and financial
harm suffered by the victims, it would be hard to deny that a
traditional tort justification of compensation9 5 comfortably
applies in these sexual abuse cases. 6 In addition, by compen-
sating the child victim of sexual abuse, we are vindicating more
than a private interest; there may be public benefits to the pri-
vate compensation of victims in these cases.' In many cases,
society would bear the cost for counseling child victims if a pri-
vate defendant did not pay. Such counseling may lessen the
social costs that would follow if the child did not receive early
treatment and as a result became a dysfunctional adult.
Compensation, however, envisions that there is some
95. See, e.g., Litan, supra note 86, at 3.
96. This abuse causes enormous physical and psychological harm. Children
experience guilt, shame, hostility, and low self-esteem. These problems
become more complex as the child grows up and experiences feelings of
isolation, mistrust, and sexual dysfunction. Statistics show that prostitutes
and substance abusers tend to have been sexually abused as children.
Professional help is available for sexually abused children or adults abused as
children. The damage is so severe, however, that years of expensive
treatment are often required. Hourly rates of $100 or more for individual
professional counseling are not uncommon. In addition, many victims of child
sexual abuse have such severe emotional problems as adults that they cannot
afford treatment; abuse renders them so emotionally damaged that they are
unable to maintain a job [sic] and must therefore rely on the strained
resources provided by private health insurance, or [state variations on
Medicare, or existing state funds for victims of violent crimes].
Grellmann, supra note 94, at 172 (notes omitted).
97. Compensation allows for early treatment which "may offer the only real hope
for breaking the cycle [of the molested becoming the molester]." See Joseph R. Long
II, Note, N.N. Moraine Mutual Insurance Co.: The Liability Insurance Intentional
Injury Exclusion in Cases of Child Sexual Abuse, 1991 Wis. L. REv. 139, 141.
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defendant who can do the compensating. Who are the poten-
tial defendants and where will they get money to satisfy these
enormous judgments? A court can accept all of the videotaped
depositions that one can conjure; but, civil cases are about
money, and if there is no one with money, everything in this
article is merely storytelling, a bit of intellectual diversion.
Potential defendants vary in both their sources for liability
and potential to provide compensation. These defendants can
be organized into general groups. For the sake of simplicity, I
will term these three groups A, B, and C.
Group A defendants are the individual abusers. This
group includes the actual perpetrators of child sexual abuse:
the incestuous family member,9" the deviant employee working
at a daycare center or a school, and the off-kilter babysitter.
Litigation against members of Group A will focus on theories
of assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress.99
Group B defendants are vicariously liable noninstitutional
98. According to a recent study, approximately 75% of child molesters are parents
or close relatives. McKibbin, supra note 63, at 483.
99. In bringing suits against direct perpetrators, plaintiffs may face a number of
substantive issues. There are statute of limitations problems for all plaintiffs over 18.
See infra note 184 and acccompanying text. Unless the court applies a "date of
discovery," as opposed to "date of injury," test to begin the statute running, almost all
these claims will be time-barred. Allen, supra note 83, at 628-31; Christine
McCormick, Comment, Litigating Incest Torts Under Homeowner's Insurance Policies,
18 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 539, 543-44 (1988).
Plaintiffs may also face defendants raising the tort defense of consent. A court
following the majority rule that this is not a defense as to at least young minors,
however, will reject this defense as a matter of law.
Defendant cites authorities to the effect that generally consent is a
defense to a willful tort, with which we have no disagreement. But we do not
see them as having any application to the instant situation for two reasons:
because the plaintiff was a minor and incapable of giving consent to acts of
this nature; and because the defendant is precluded from taking advantage of
any consent he seduced or coerced her into giving to engage in such activities.
It would be an agreement for him to perpetrate a crime in violation of the
protections our statute affords minors by prohibiting contributing to their
delinquency, and would be so contrary to commonly accepted standards of
decency and morality that any consensual agreement to engage in such
conduct would be rejected by the law as against public policy and void.
Wherefore, it is our conclusion that the court was justified in refusing
defendant's request to instruct the jury that if the plaintiff consented she
could not recover.
Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37, 40 (Utah 1980) (notes omitted).
Also, defendant may claim intrafamily immunity as a bar to suit. Although par-
ent-child immunity has been widely criticized and abrogated in many jurisdictions,
some vestiges remain. Allen, supra note 83, at 633-35.
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defendants. This group includes nonparticipating spouses or
significant others of Group A members who knew or should
have known about the individual abuser's conduct. It also
includes the owners of family home daycares. These family
home daycares generally accept a few children in addition to
the daycare operator's own children and do business out of the
operator's own home.l °° Allegations that are variants on the
theme of negligent supervision or negligent control will char-
acterize civil complaints against the members of Group B.
Group C defendants are the vicariously liable institutional
defendants. This group includes out-of-home daycare opera-
tions, daycare centers, and state licensing agencies. Here the
complaint will include such allegations as negligent hiring,
negligent supervision, negligent or inadequate licensing proce-
dures, and negligent investigation.10'
Assuming that courts accept videotaped child depositions
and an ever-increasing number of civil actions are brought
against the members of these groups, where will the money for
a settlement or a plaintiff's verdict come from? As you might
expect, the answer varies with each group.
a. Compensation From Individual Abusers
Group A defendants, typically family members, daycare
employees, or babysitters, have only two potential sources
from which to satisfy a judgment: private wealth or a home-
100. In 1985 an estimated two-thirds of the children in daycare were in these
family home daycares. Irene Pave, The Insurance Crisis That Could Cripple Daycare,
Bus. WK., June 17, 1985, at 114, 116. This statistic may not be greatly changed today.
For example, according to information from a recent interview with an officer of the
National Association of Daycare Providers, of 20,000 daycares in Texas, 15,000 were
family home daycares, and of the 1,600 daycares in Missouri, 800 were family-run.
Note that Texas, Florida, and California have the highest concentrations of daycares in
the country. (The interviews cited hereafter took place under a condition of anonimity.
Therefore, formal citations are omitted.)
101. See, e.g., Andrade v. Ellefson, 391 N.W.2d 836 (Minn. 1986); Brasel v.
Children's Servs. Div., 642 P.2d 696 (Or. Ct. App. 1982); State Shares Guilt in Abuse at
Daycare, TACOMA NEws TRIB. (Tacoma, Wash.), Mar. 3, 1988, at Al. See also
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (While holding that
42 U.S.C. § 1983 was not available to the plaintiff, the court notes that "[i]t may well be
that, by voluntarily undertaking to protect Joshua against a danger it concededly
played no part in creating, the State acquired a duty under state tort law to provide
him with adequate protection against danger."). Id. at 201. These types of claims will
be defended by establishing that the institution conducted reasonable background
checks and afforded adequate supervision to avoid foreseeable harms and/or that there
is no respondeat superior relation with the actual transgressor. McKibbin, supra note
63, at 486, 497-98.
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owner's insurance policy. As to private wealth, there are obvi-
ously not many Group A defendants who can satisfy a six
figure judgment.10 2 Although some individuals undoubtedly
exist, and some fraction of those individuals might molest chil-
dren, the pool is probably not large enough to provide a mean-
ingful source of compensation in the larger scheme.
That leaves homeowner's insurance. l s In almost every
case where a homeowner's policy has been looked to as a
source of compensation for a sexually abused child, however,
the insurance company has successfully avoided liability on the
claim.1
0 4
Insurance companies have avoided compensating child vic-
tims in a number of ways. Some courts have held that the
child sex abuse claim is outside of the scope of the home-
owner's policy. Insurers are able to do this because many
homeowner insurance policies limit coverage to losses from
"occurrences." 105 These courts have held that the term "occur-
rences" refers to acts of negligence and that molesting a child
is not a negligent act.1° 6
Most of the courts that find for the insurance company in
child molestation cases, however, have held that the case trig-
gers one of the exclusions from coverage in the insurance con-
tract. A claim against a family member might be excluded
because many policies do not cover harm to residents of the
insured premises. °7 Molestation by a daycare employee that
took place in a nearby parking lot might not be covered
because the policy only covers acts occurring on the prem-
ises. 0" Still other policies exclude harms caused by felonies. 1°9
102. Grellmann, supra note 94, at 173. But see Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37
(Utah 1980) ($42,000 damages against former boss who married his secretary and then
molested stepdaughter).
103. Insurance is likely the only source for compensating the child victim. See
Long, supra note 97, at 140 (noting that "the abuser's liability insurance may be the
only effective means of paying for the [expensive] specialized treatment that the child
might need").
104. Generally, the insurance company brings a declaratory judgment action
requesting a ruling that it is not obligated to pay, and the court grants a judgment in
favor of the insurance company at a summary judgment motion. See, e.g., Allstate Ins.
Co. v. Kim, 206 Cal. Rptr. 609 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
105. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
106. Vermont Mut. Ins. Co. v. Malcolm, 517 A.2d 800, 802 (N.H. 1986). See also
supra note 63 and accompanying text.
107. McCormick, supra note 99, at 561.
108. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 684 F. Supp. 1056, 1057 (W.D. Okla.
1988).
109. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Talbot, 690 F. Supp. 886, 888 (N.D. Cal. 1988). In
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Finally, some preclude coverage against any individual con-
victed of a serious sexual offense.
The insurance company's principal avenue out of liability
under these homeowner policies, however, falls under the
exclusion for acts done with "intent to injure."'110 The general
rule that courts across the country traditionally have applied
in interpreting the "intent to injure" exclusion requires both
an intent to do the injurious act and an intent to cause serious
injury."1 This latter requirement focused on the insured's sub-
jective intent.1 2  In so focusing, courts have recognized that
they were not assessing liability for tort, but rather were
assessing coverage on an insurance policy.
113
Consistent with this traditional approach, insured defend-
ants in child molestation cases have attempted to combat insur-
ance company assertions of the "intent to injure" exclusion
with expert psychological testimony to the effect that, in the
defendants' twisted minds, they believed that they were not
harming the children and that their act was really one of love
and affection."x 4 Though such a position may not find sympa-
thy with most of us, it does comport with some views in the
expert community as to how some child molesters might
this regard, the insurance industry's model homeowner's policy, the Comprehensive
General Liability Policy, excludes "personal injury arising out of the willful violation
of a penal statute . .. committed by or with knowledge or consent of any insured."
McKibbin, supra note 63, at 496.
110. The Comprehensive General Liability policy excludes "bodily injury expected
or intended from the standpoint of the insured." McKibbin, supra note 63, at 496. For
a thorough and thoughtful discussion of the "intentional injury" exclusion, see Long,
supra note 97.
111. ROBERT E. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW: BASIC TExT, § 5.4(b) (1971). See also
State Auto Mut. Ins. Co. v. McIntyre, 652 F. Supp. 1177, 1187 (N.D. Ala. 1987); Michael
J. Grady & Heather A. McKee, Insurance Coverage For Sexual Molestation of a
Minor, 56 DEF. CouNs. J. 170, 173 (1989).
112. Mclntyre, 652 F. Supp. at 1193-94.
113. See, e.g., Congregation of Rodef Sholom of Marin v. American Motorists Ins.
Co., 154 Cal. Rptr. 348, 351 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979); McCormick, supra note 99, at 558.
This is consistent with the general approach of courts towards insurance contracts.
Courts strictly interpret insurance contracts to favor the insured probably because
insurance contracts are generally boilerplate agreements over which the insured has
little bargaining leverage and because insurance contracts are the product of an
industry largely exempt from the constraints of federal antitrust law. See McCarron-
Ferguson Act of 1945, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1984); see 13 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAw
AND PRAcTICE, §§ 7401-07 (1979); 2 GEORGE J. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW
2d, § 15:74, at 341-47 (1984).
114. See, e.g., CNA Ins. v. McGinnis, 666 S.W.2d 689, 690-91 (Ark. 1984); Grange
Ins. Ass'n v. Authier, 45 Wash. App. 383, 386, 725 P.2d 642, 643 (1986). For additional
citations for the proposition that true pedophiles do not necessarily intend to harm
their victims, see Long, supra note 97, at 147, 157-59.
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think.11 Nonetheless, when policy holders sue insurance com-
panies for failure to pay in child sex abuse cases, most courts
have granted summary judgment in favor of the insurance
companies refusing to even consider any evidence concerning
the abuser's subjective intent.
116
In reaching this result, courts tend to rely on one of three
forms of legal vocabulary. Some speak in the tort language of
"natural and probable consequences.""17 These courts have lit-
tle trouble finding that harm to a child is the natural and prob-
able consequence of sexually abusing that child. Others talk in
the vocabulary of inferring harm "as a matter of law,""' 8 while
still others argue that the harm is "against public policy."
119
The result of all three approaches is the same. Coverage is
denied the defendant and recovery is thereby denied the
child.120
Whatever the talk of "public policy," the reality is that the
court is likely taking money from an innocent, abused child.'
21
115. Grellmann, supra note 94, at 180.
116. See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 117-19.
117. Altena v. United Fire & Cas. Co., 422 N.W.2d 485, 489 (Iowa 1988).
118. Linebaugh v. Berdish, 376 N.W.2d 400, 405 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985); Rodriguez v.
Williams, 107 Wash. 2d 381, 397, 729 P.2d 627, 630 (1986).
119. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Talbot, 690 F. Supp. 886, 891 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
120. There are very few exceptions to the rule established in the "intent to injure"
cases. One court has ruled that intent to harm must be specifically and subjectively
proved. MacKinnon v. Hanover Ins. Co., 471 A.2d 1166 (N.H. 1984). Another court has
compromised, finding that the intent to harm must be specifically and subjectively
proved unless there exists penetration, violence, or fear of violence. Zordan v. Page,
500 So. 2d 608, 610-11 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986), review denied sub norn. So. Carolina
Ins. Co. v. Zordan, 508 S. 2d 15 (Fla. 1987).
For a brief period, a third court dealt with the issue as a question of evidentiary
burdens. For this federal court, sexual abuse was presumed to be willful and
intentional unless the defendant presented "credible testimony" that he or she did not
intend to harm the child or that he or she was suffering from diminished capacity such
that an intent to injure could not be formed. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Estate of
Jenner, 856 F.2d 1359, 1364-65 (9th Cir. 1988). This third approach, which gave the
trial court at summary judgment a great deal of power to decide what is credible
testimony, was abandoned on rehearing in light of contrary positions taken by the
relevant state supreme court and a sister federal appellate court. State Farm and Cas.
Co. v. Estate of Jenner, 874 F.2d 604, 607 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Fire Ins. Exchange v.
Abbott, 251 Cal. Rptr. 620 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) and State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v.
Abraio, 874 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1988)). Both Abbott and Abraio found an irrebutable
presumption that intent to injure followed from an act of sexual molestation.
121. See In re James A., 505 A.2d 1386, 1389 (R.I. 1986); MacKinnon, 471 A.2d at
1168 (public policy favors insuring intentional tortfeasors in order to compensate
children). See also Congregation of Rodef Sholom of Main v. American Motorists Ins.
Co., 154 Cal. Rptr. 348, 352-51 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (strong public interest in
compensating victims "reinforces the well-settled principle that such exclusionary
clauses should be interpreted as narrowly as possible").
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Why then have courts denied coverage under these home-
owner policies? Certainly the doctrinal approach that they had
already developed to interpret the scope of the "intent to
injure" exclusion could at least have allowed the insured
defendant to get past summary judgment.
Much of what is really going on is, I believe, moral disgust.
Most judges simply cannot bring themselves to find that the
sentence "the man sexually molested the three-year old girl,
but meant her no harm whatsoever" is anything but literal
nonsense. 122 In addition to denying coverage based on moral
disgust, some courts, as noted above, deny coverage due to
"public policy."' 3 We do not want wrongdoers to be insured
for their intentional misconduct. Such coverage might
encourage them to do what they otherwise would not risk
because they know that, even if they get caught, they will get
off the hook without having to pay anything for their inten-
tional wrongdoing.
This has a nice ring to it until you try to apply it to the
child molester. Child molestation is not motivated by econom-
ics. Because no economic benefit is received from the abuse,
no windfall is obtained if the molester is covered by insurance.
As for taking the sting out of any penalty carried by a damage
award,124 in these circumstances a judgment for damages is the
least consequential penalty that this person might face.
Shame, guilt, and the likelihood that there has been a criminal
conviction labelling the defendant as a child molester for life
and placing him or her into prison for a substantial period of
time will likely suffice. As a matter of pure public policy, it
122. See, e.g., Zordan v. Page, 500 So. 2d 608, 613 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) ("one
may have a first, visceral reaction which is strongly adverse to any conclusion that a
person who engages in sexual fondling of a child may be covered by liability
insurance"). Admittedly, it is hard for most of us to think of sexual abuse as
accidental. Because we abhor pedophiles' behavior, "we reflexively treat it as if it
were an intentional evil." Long, supra note 97, at 169 (footnote omitted). Our notions
of "intentionally" include both purpose and knowledge. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.02 (1985). How then could the abuser not "know" they were harming the child?
There would have to be something totally wrong with their mind. Of course, that is
the point.
123. L. Stuart Griggs, Note, The Intentional Injury Exclusion: When is There No
Intent Behind the Intention?, 11 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 527, 527-28 (1988).
124. Tort may serve to punish or to exact retribution. Litan, supra note 86, at 3;
JOHN G. FLEMING, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAw OF TORTs 6 (2d ed. 1985). Cf.
Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257 (1989) (punitive
damages constitutional).
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seems more attractive to compensate the injured child."2
Courts may also justify the exclusion of intentionally
caused injuries from insurance policies by consideration of the
economics of the insurance business. 12  This perhaps provides
some rejoinder to our initial inclination to compensate the
child at the insurance company's expense. Insurance compa-
nies use risk analysis to create profit.' Intentional acts
designed to cause injury do not fall within the "actuary calcu-
lations of the random occurrence; thus they are excluded from
these calculations."'"
Translated into legal vocabulary, an insurance policy is a
contract. The insurance company agrees to take certain risks.
It specifically does not agree to take other risks. Sympathies
aside, a deal is a deal, and that is the end of it. To some extent,
however, what the deal is will be a matter of interpretation for
the court.
Courts could therefore admit evidence of a defendant's
subjective intent in these declaratory judgment proceedings.
Even if the courts admitted this evidence, however, the conse-
quences would be minimal. First, denying a summary judg-
ment motion to the insurance company does not mean that a
jury will buy the defendant's position that he or she did not
intend to harm. Jurors are not likely to be any different than
judges in their reaction to this argument. Unless they are
swayed by a belief that finding against the insurance company
is the only way that the child will be compensated, defendants
are not all that likely to win a large portion of these declara-
tory judgment cases at trial on the merits.
Second, whether or not insurance companies currently cal-
culate the risks of molestation in their homeowner's insurance
policies, as a practical matter, they are certainly capable of
adding these risks into their actuarial calculus. If, however,
these risks are not already calculated by the company when
issuing the policy, someone will have to pay for the increased
risk. There is little mystery regarding who that someone will
be.
This leads to the strongest argument for not allowing
juries to rule that child molestation is included in a home-
125. See supra note 121. See also Griggs, supra note 123, at 541.
126. Griggs, supra note 123, at 527-28.
127. Id at 527.
128. Id at 528.
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owner's insurance policy. The basic premise for this type of
insurance is cost-spreading among the pool of people on whom
the insured against risk is likely to fall. Put simply, all of us
who have homeowner insurance policies split the cost of insur-
ing against each other's potential losses. I can afford an insur-
ance premium that may never give me a payback, but I cannot
afford to pay out a huge lump sum should random disaster
strike. You or I might feel very differently about subsidizing
the risk that someone will molest a child, generally their own.
This is because neither of us will likely see a risk that one of
us covered by the policy will molest a child. We may well be
offended that such a possibility were even suggested and might
hesitate to pay a premium to subsidize that risk in other
households.'
If courts allow child sexual abuse to be covered by home-
owner policies, they sanction a form of private "charity" in
which Party A contributes money through an insurance pre-
mium to compensate children who might be molested by Party
B.is Party A may not be willing to do this. Party A may not
even agree that this is an efficient method for compensating
abused children.''
Speculation aside, however, when all the dust in this area
settles, there is one significant point that is clear: Overwhelm-
ingly, there will be no source of money to satisfy judgments
against defendants in Group A.
b. Compensation From Vicariously Liable Noninstitutional
Defendants
Initially, we may think that plaintiffs will be more success-
ful in seeking compensation from the nonparticipating spouse
or significant other and the family home daycare owners that
comprise Group B. One might think that the spouse or signifi-
129. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Williams, 42 Wash. App. 633, 636, 713 P.2d 135, 137
(1986) (in discussing homeowner's insurance and child sexual abuse, the court noted,
"[t]he average person purchasing homeowner's insurance would cringe at the very
suggestion that he was paying for such coverage"), aff'd, 107 Wash. 2d 381, 729 P.2d
627 (1986).
130. Of course, if courts begin to interpret homeowner's insurance policies this
way, insurance companies will specifically exclude such coverage on all new or
renewed policies, leaving only those molesters who have older policies with resources
to pay any judgment.
131. Also, one may well ask how far we will take this. Will we sanction suits for
"awful parenting" with accompanying claims against insurance companies? Perhaps
we should.
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cant other who negligently failed to observe or restrain the
actual molester will be covered by insurance, because his or
her transgression is within the realm of negligence, the very
type of risks these policies were meant to cover.
The spouse or significant other's act, however, will likely
be excluded from the homeowner's insurance policy. The
existence of coverage in this situation will depend upon
whether the exclusions in the policy refer to "the insured" as
opposed to "an insured" or "any insured." If the policy refers
to the former, the exclusion will not apply to the spouse or sig-
nificant other and coverage will be found."3 2 If the latter,
insurance coverage will be denied."s As a matter of textual
interpretation, this might make some superficial sense. When
the exclusion only applies to "the" insured, it leaves the possi-
bility open that other insureds under the policy who did not
commit an act of intentional harm would be covered by insur-
ance. But substituting the "an/any" language, one could sup-
pose this first inference negated.
The problem is that the spouse or significant other is not
seeking insurance coverage as one vicariously liable for the
actual abuser's intentional action. Rather, that person is seek-
ing coverage for his or her own negligence. Courts, however,
have seemingly not considered this interpretation. Not surpris-
ingly, any existing insurance policy that does not now use the
"an/any" formulation will by anyone's standards qualify as a
genuine museum piece. Thus, the only possible source of com-
pensation for the abused child from the spouse or significant
other would be private assets, and it is no more likely that this
category of defendants will have sufficient resources than
those in Group A.
Children seeking recovery from small family-owned home
daycare operations fare no better. These are run by people
who take in a few kids in order to supplement their incomes.
Financially, these daycare operators are in relatively the same
positions as defendants in Group A. They typically operate on
too small a scale to afford commercial insurance even if it were
available to them."s Even in those instances in which insur-
132. Hildebrand v. Holyoke Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 386 A.2d 329, 331 (Me. 1978). See
generally Grady & McKee, supra note 111, at 177.
133. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Gilbert, 852 F.2d 449, 453-54 (9th Cir. 1988). See
also Grady & McKee, supra note 111.
134. I will discuss this and the general issue of insurance within the daycare
industry later. For purposes of this section, it is sufficient to point out that in today's
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ance companies make liability insurance available, coverage of
sexual child abuse is all but nonexistent.135
The bottom line is that there will be no insurance cover-
age for sexual abuse in these family home daycares. Unless
the home itself has substantial equity that can be used to sat-
isfy the judgment,136 the plaintiff has no source of compensa-
tion. In short, there is not likely to be any more money
available from defendants in Group B than there was from
those in Group A.
c. Compensation From Vicariously Liable Institutional
Defendants
The independent daycares and state licensing agencies that
comprise Group C may offer plaintiffs some deep pockets.
Commercial policies are available to for-profit daycares and for
even nonprofit daycares that operate as part of a larger facility.
With rare exceptions, these policies exclude child sexual
abuse.1 37 A few companies, however, are beginning to offer a
sexual abuse rider with a limited ceiling on coverage."
In addition, employers are beginning to offer on or near-
market almost no major insurance company will offer liability coverage to a family
home daycare in either a commercial policy or as a "business endorsement." An
"endorsement" is an additional coverage on a standard policy in which the insurer
agrees to provide, generally, for an additional premium to their homeowner's
insurance. A business endorsement on a homeowner's policy would add coverage for
business activities conducted at home. See infra notes 199-202 and accompanying text
for discussion of why insurance companies do not like to insure family daycares.
135. These observations are based upon my interviews with daycare operators and
associations, and members of the insurance industry, as well as the UNITED STATES
DEPT. LABOR, REPORT OF THE INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE TO THE DIRECTOR
OF THE TASK FORCE ON CHILDCARE LIABILITY INSURANCE (1989) [hereinafter
INSURANCE INSTITUTE]. The Institute was retained by the Department of Labor to
assess the availability of insurance for daycare. The Institute conducted this task by
sending a survey to three national trade associations for insurance.
According to the report, these associations "constituted virtually the entire
universe of insurance intermediaries" likely to provide this coverage. The report
consists of several documents: a cover memo from M. Rosenberg, supporting memos
from M.C. Keegan-Ayer, and various responses to the survey, including a 'focus group'
report of National Association of Professional Insurance Agents (NAPIA). The report
is available from J. Rochman, Insurance Information Institute, 1101 17th Street N. W.,
Suite 408, Washington, DC 20036.
136. Because almost all jurisdictions provide a homestead exemption which bars
resorting to a home as an asset to satisfy "debts," the plaintiff can only recover any
amount over the homestead exemption. See, e.g., Allen v. Crane, 116 N.W. 392 (Mich.
1908).
137. See infra note 202 and accompanying text.
138. See NAT. ASSOC. OF DAY CARE PROVIDERS, GENERAL INFORMATION PAMPHLET
(1990) (copy on file with University of Puget Sound Law Review).
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site daycare.139 This phenomenon is likely to rapidly increase
in the near future."4 These employers, who will likely be held
responsible for the welfare of employees' children at any day-
care that they run or even recommend,' 4' have both commer-
cial policies and the assets of their businesses as sources of
compensation. Furthermore, suits against state agencies for
failures in their licensing and/or investigative processes are
also economically feasible. Plaintiffs suing agencies can go
after state funds.
However, assuming both an increase in suits and the fact
that some of these suits will be brought against Group C mem-
bers, many of the insurance resources available to Group C
will begin to dry up"4 as insurance companies stop offering
coverage for sexual abuse or price the coverage out of reach of
most of the market. 43  Thus, there is no guaranteed recovery,
even against institutional defendants.'"
139. See, e.g., Michael Schacher, FAA Opens Chicago-Area Daycare Facility, Bus.
INS., July 3, 1989, at 6; Genetech Daycare, Bus. INS., July 3, 1989, at 6. Generally, only
large organizations will sponsor on or near-site daycare. As to these, there is no
problem adding daycare to their insurance, especially if the company already is paying
a high premium. Many companies, however, prefer "voucher" systems where they
give their employees vouchers to apply to the daycare of their choice. These voucher
systems avoid both potential liability and the general headaches of dealing with
daycare. INSURANCE INSTITUTE, supra note 135. See also Jim Szmanski & Jerry Dyer,
Taking Care of Baby, MORNING NEWS TRIB. (Tacoma, Wash.) Nov. 11, 1991, at C7. A
study of Washington state employers shows that 16% offered or considered child care
benefits for their workers. Id. However, only 2.4% offer employee sponsored daycare.
Id.
140. Roger Bornes, Childcare Grabs Benefits Spotlight, NAT'L UNDERwRrrER
(Property & Cas./Risk & Benefits Management Edition), Apr. 10, 1989, at 23. See also
INSURANCE INSTITUTE, supra note 135 (employer-sponsored daycare grew from 5% to
10% of the daycare insurance market between 1987 and 1989).
141. Kari Berman, Employer-Sponsored Daycare Holds Risks, Bus. INS., Oct. 10,
1988, at 20. Most employers who provide on or near-site daycare do so through an
independent contractor with whom they have "hold harmless" agreements.
INSURANCE INSTITUTE, supra note 135. To the extent that the independent contractor
neither can obtain insurance for child sexual abuse nor has assets to cover any
judgment, however, the hold harmless agreement does not protect the company from
this risk.
142. Child sexual abuse is least likely to happen in these Group C facilities; see
infra notes 157-60 and accompanying text. Yet, historical experience leads one to
believe that it would not take more than a few big losses to convince insurance
companies to abandon coverage for sexual abuse at these facilities. See infra notes 174-
91 and accompanying text.
143. To understand why it is likely that insurance companies would respond this
way, even if most of the suits were unsuccessful and/or they maintained their profit
margins as a result of a corresponding increase in facilities paying premiums, see
Section III-C(4)(b).
144. Even if the price of such insurance skyrocketed, daycares would not be driven
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d. Summary
The immediate consequence of accepting the evidentiary
arguments for the admission of videotaped child testimony is
that there will be a larger number of suits with higher settle-
ments and judgments for plaintiffs. However, the sources for
satisfying these settlements and judgments are not terribly
promising for those who wish to bring suits for sexual child
abuse. Indeed, suits against defendants in Group C are the
only suits that make any economic sense to initiate. To the
extent the use of videotaped depositions increases the number
of these civil suits and the size of the settlements, the increase
will occur solely in Group C suits.
As a result, few children that have been molested will be
compensated. Those receiving compensation first must choose
to bring suit and then find an attorney who is willing to repre-
sent them. Second, those who are compensated must have
been molested in one of the limited number of daycare facili-
ties that are insured for child molesting or have substantial
assets.145 A child may also recover where the state has blun-
dered in its licensing and supervision functions. One might
question whether this is an efficient or just way to provide
injured children with the treatment and counselling that they
will require. 14
out of the market. As long as general liability insurance is available, it is hard to
imagine that daycares currently in operation will close because they cannot get the
special rider or that new daycares will not enter the market on this account. In
theory, federal or state legislatures could use taxpayer money to form an insurance
pool or order insurance companies to form pools to subsidize insurance for child sexual
abuse. In the first case, costs will be broadly distributed among the taxpayers. In the
second, the insurance companies will pass the costs onto those carrying other forms of
insurance.
But will the lack of sexual abuse insurance be so important that legislatures will
step in? It is not likely. Inevitably, accidents will happen when young children are
playing. Liability insurance seems essential. In contrast to accidents, child molestation
hardly seems inevitable, and every daycare has a strong incentive to do everything it
can to avoid it happening. See infra note 156.
It would seem peculiar if parents/consumers began to distinguish among the
daycares to which they are willing to send their children based upon which could
economically insure against sexual child abuse. To the extent that this would be a
significant competitive criteria, however, only very large chain-type daycares could
compete.
145. This, of course, assumes that insurance coverage is still being offered for
sexual abuse, or the facility has sufficient assets to pay the judgment. If the latter is
true, and the daycare does not have the resources of a national daycare that may be
able to self-insure, the lawsuit may drive the facility out of existence. Depending on
the circumstances, this result may be viewed as good or bad.
146. The efficiency and fairness of the current tort system as a mechanism for
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2. Deterrence: Discouraging Child Sexual Abuse 4 7
Not surprisingly, the deterrent effect of admitting child
videotaped testimony also varies with the three groups of
defendants.
a. Deterring the Individual Abuser"'
Group A defendants are unlikely to be deterred by the
possibility of a civil suit. They have not been discouraged by
the possibility of being labelled as child molesters within our
society or the risk of a felony conviction. Nor have they been
deterred by the threat of long prison sentences in enclosed
environments with very dangerous people who, incidentally,
view child molesters as the lowest form of life on earth. To
boot, only in exceptional cases will individual sex abusers have
enough assets to economically justify someone bringing a civil
suit against them. In summary, even if individual sex abusers
cared about a possible civil judgment, which is unlikely, the
threat of civil litigation would be a rational deterrent to only a
small minority.
b. Deterring the Nonparticipating Spouse and the Family
Home Daycare Operator
Group B is a mixed bag, consisting of both nonparticipat-
ing spouses and home daycare operators. Some might believe
compensation has been strongly questioned and criticized. See, e.g., George L. Priest,
Products Liability Law and the Accident Rate, in LIABILITY: PERSPEcTrIVES AND
PoLicY 209 (Robert E. Litan & Clifford Winston eds., 1988); Steven D. Sugarman,
Doing Away With Personal Injury Law, in PERSPECTIVES ON TORT LAW 126, 148-54 (R.
Rabin ed., 1990); JoHN G. FLEMING, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TORTS 17 (1985).
147. Deterrence is a recognized goal of the tort system. Litan, supra note 86, at 3;
Joseph Sanders & Craig Joyce, "Off to the Races" The 1980's Tort Crisis and the Law
Reform Process, 27 Hous. L. REv. 207, 224 (1990).
148. Criminal sexual deviance is among the least deterrable of all criminal
behaviors. William J. Chambliss, Types of Deviance and the Fffectiveness of Legal
Sanctions, 1967 WIS. L. REV. 707, 713-15 (1967). Chambliss analyzed potential
deterrence on particular types of deviance in terms of two variables: "the type of act"
and "the degree of commitment to crime as a way of life."
The degree of commitment was further divided into high and low, while the type
of act was divided into instrumental and expressive. Instrumental acts were means to
practical ends. Expressive acts were done for their own pleasure. Id. at 713.
According to Chambliss, the least likely to be deterred are those who are low
commitment expressive or high commitment expressive. Id
Sex offenders fall into these two categories. Id See also FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING &
GORGON J. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE 138-39 (1973) ("Our analysis is largely consistent
with the theory advanced by Professor Chambliss that instrumental crime is more
susceptible to deterrence than expressive crime.") (footnote omitted).
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that nonparticipating spouses will not be affected by the risk of
civil litigation. 4 9 After all, personal motivations alone should
have been strong enough to cause the spouse or significant
other to intercede. Their lack of intervention indicates the
presence of even stronger personal motivations that made
them unwilling to "see" or act on the abuse. It is hard to
believe that fear of losing money would add much into the
balance.
Others may argue that the nonparticipating spouse might
be pushed to action when confronted with the risk of losing his
or her home and possessions. Unlike the actual abuser, the
nonparticipating spouse has not displayed indifference to far
greater risk than economic loss. Nor is the spouse motivated
by satiating deviant sexual desires. Under this view, the likeli-
hood that the plaintiff would not find it economically viable to
bring suit is outweighed by the spouse's belief that such a suit
is possible.'5s
Initially, family home daycare providers appear more
likely to be deterred by the potential risk of civil litigation. To
the extent that the abuse is carried out by an employee, as
opposed to a family member, 151 home daycare providers who
fear civil litigation may take more care in screening and super-
vising their employees. This, in turn, might reduce the
instances of molestation.
Also, some home daycare providers cannot afford or can-
not even obtain insurance.15  If it appears that suits are
becoming more prevalent, even if very few are against home
daycares, some of those who are currently willing to risk being
uninsured might decide that it is no longer worth the worry
and fold their tents. Such closures might indirectly cause a
decline in the instances of child abuse by reducing the opportu-
nities in which it can take place. 5 3
In reality, a home daycare owner is unlikely to be moti-
vated by the lack of insurance since most home daycares cur-
149. But see infra notes 174-180 and accompanying text, for a discussion of some
economic considerations.
150. One reason that a suit is unlikely is that an attorney must believe that the
potential award is great enough to justify taking the case on contingency and fronting
the costs.
151. Many, if not most, home daycares, however, have no employees. They are
run by the owner of the residence.
152. See infra note 202 and accompanying text.
153. This proposition is based on the assumption that the children do not return to
daycares with higher per capita instances of molestation than these daycares.
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rently carry on business without insurance."s  This fact
counterbalances the deterrent effect of the increased risk of
litigation. To the extent that these daycares are not insured,
they are not compelled to follow insurance requirements that
reduce the chances of sexual abuse. Further, liability insur-
ance is a precondition for many state licensing schemes."s
Those daycares unable to afford or obtain insurance cannot be
licensed in these states. As a result, most continue their opera-
tions without licensing, thus forgoing the accompanying state
licensing and inspection standards that reduce the possibility of
sexual abuse.
We cannot draw an absolute conclusion regarding the
deterrent effect caused by an increase in litigation against non-
participating spouses and family daycare providers. Although
the increased risk of liability may push some nonparticipating
spouses to action, others will remain unwilling or unable to
act. The increased risk of litigation is likely to cause family
daycare providers to screen employees more carefully.
Because most family daycare providers do not have insurance,
some will leave the business rather than risk suit. However,
most providers will stay in business without insurance and
will, therefore, not face the very insurance requirements that
tend to reduce the chances of abuse.
c. Deterring Institutional Daycares and State Licensing
Facilities
The commercial daycares, nonprofit daycares, and
employer sponsored daycares that constitute Group C already
have very strong motives to avoid the possibility of child
molestation even without the risk of lawsuit. Commercial day-
cares seek to minimize risk to their business reputation.' s6
154. This proposition is based on interviews with daycare operators and
associations across the country.
155. Licensing requirements vary greatly throughout the country: In some,
licensing is not mandatory; in others, it is. In some, licensing involves registering and
paying a small fee; in others, rigorous requirements must be met. In some, no
insurance is required; in others, it is a precondition. Based on interviews with child
care licensing inspector, Thurston County, Washington on Sept. 11, 1990. See also Greg
J. Matis, Dilemma in Daycare: The Virtues of Administrative Accommodation, 57 U.
CHI. L. REV. 573, 575-79 (1990) (current licensing regulations vary from state to state
with little uniformity; many states totally or partially exempt churches-among the
largest single daycare providers in the nation-from regulation).
156. Individuals have noneconomic, at least nonlitigation-focused, reasons to avoid
doing harm. Sugarman, supra note 146, at 128-130. Most of the noneconomic concerns
attributed to Group C apply equally to Group B owners of family home daycares.
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Even without a lawsuit, community knowledge that children in
their care have been molested would rank above even a hepati-
tis epidemic for keeping potential customers from walking
through their doors. Also, in most states these institutions
have to be licensed in order to function. Because instances of
child molestation could cost a commercial daycare its license, it
has a strong incentive to avoid child abuse instances.
Employer operated daycares have additional motivation to
avoid the risk of child molestation, even absent the threat of
litigation. An instance of child molestation .at an employer
provided daycare would almost certainly damage employee
morale and productivity. It could also destroy the business
reputation of the firm. Thus, nonlitigation reasons already
exist that should deter commercial and employer operated day-
cares from allowing molestation.
When an increase in the economic risk of lawsuits is added
to nonlitigation deterrents, these Group C potential defendants
are likely to behave in ways that further reduce the risk of
sexual child abuse." 7 They are likely to do this in a variety of
ways. First, these potential defendants likely will create safer
facilities, constructed to reduce the risk of child abuse. Thus,
some daycares will operate within a large, single room that has
no barrier behind which an adult could isolate a child from the
rest of the group. 5 Group C potential defendants are also
likely to adopt policies that reduce the chances of sexual
abuse.'5 9 They will take more care in screening and supervis-
ing their employees. At the very least, employees with prior
records of sexual abuse will not be hired.'l e These results
157. Group C defendants have responded in ways analagous to automobile
manufacturers and drivers faced with deterrent measures. See Walter J. Blum &
Harry Kalven, Jr., The Empty Cabinet of Dr. Calabresi. Auto Accidents and General
Deterrence, in PERSPEcTIvES ON TORT LAW 192 (R. Rabin ed., 1990) (general
deterrance in auto arena leads to the increased discovery of safety techniques, the
improvement of driving, and the substitution of safer activities).
158. Berman, supra note 141, at 18.
159. The Board of Directors of one daycare interviewed has adopted a policy that
no employee can transport a child in his or her own car, and no single supervisor can
leave the daycare with a child.
160. Legislation may enable this approach. For example, the law in Washington
allows all "businesses and organizations providing services to children" to obtain
criminal records of prospective employees or volunteers. WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 43.43.830, 43.43.832 (1990). See also, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-883.02 (1986 &
Supp. 1990) (daycare employees must register, be fingerprinted, and certify not
convicted of listed crime); COLO. REV. STAT. § 26-6-107 (1)(a)(I) (1986 & Supp. 1990)
(daycare employees to be fingerprinted to allow for investigation of employee); ILL.
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seem to be positive; however, there are potential downsides.
For example, increased screening also raises potential
problems. If those doing the screening for daycare jobs become
too risk averse, they will tend not to hire otherwise qualified
people. A specific risk is that they will refuse to hire those
who appear as a "proxy" for child molesters.' 6 ' Increased
screening 62 and supervision, as well as possible construction to
produce safer facilities, may carry their own negatives. The
costs of screening, supervising, and improving daycares may
have a particularly negative economic impact on nonprofit
daycares.
Of all of the daycare facilities outside of family homes,
only a small percentage are commercial, for-profit, or
employer provided daycares. 1" Most daycare facilities are
associated with a school, a church, or some other nonprofit
organization. 164 Most of these run on a "shoe string" budget
and often provide daycare services for lower-income parents.1'1
This daycare service is sometimes provided at no fee, but more
often at a cost which is far lower than that charged in for-
profit daycares. 166
REV. STAT. ch. 23, 2214.1 (1988) (daycare employees subject to criminal background
investigation).
161. A proxy is a person who represents a stereotype of the provider's view of a
person likely to molest a child. For a good discussion of the concept of and problem
with "proxies," see RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 345, 367-71 (1983).
Specifically, employers might respond to the cultural archetype of child molesters
as men and perhaps gays and, as a result, discriminate against men in the hiring
process. Correspondingly, as more suits are brought, men may gradually take
themselves out of the daycare job market for fear of working in a situation where they
will be accused because they fit the archetype.
162. With increased screening, at least one company has emerged that offers pre-
employment screening to daycares. See McKibbin, supra note 63, at 485. The
effectiveness of such screening, and the risks that it carries, depends on whether there
is a convincing scientific basis for such predictive screening.
163. As of 1985, for-profit daycares served only 4% of the child daycare market.
Pave, supra note 100, at 116.
164. Margaret LeRoux, Liability Insurers Are Abandoning Daycare Centers
Across the U.S., Bus. INS., June 10, 1985, at 2, 37.
165. This is based on interviews with daycare associations and providers. See also
Linda Kocolowski, "Why Me?" Ask Daycare Operators, NAT'L UNDERWRITER
(Property & Cas./Risk Benefits Management Ins. Edition) 1985, at 32 [hereinafter
Kocolowski, Why Me.] ("Except for the large daycare chains-like Kindercare which
had net income of $160 million in 1984-most of the estimated 20 million children in
daycare in the United States are in nonprofit centers associated with churches or other
community-based organizations"). In fact, churches are among the largest daycare
providers in the country. Matis, supra note 155, at 575.
166. See Pave, supra note 100, at 114 (author discusses plight of daycare center
serving "low-income minority and migrant workers").
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If the costs associated with screening, supervision, and
improvement of the facilities become substantial, most of these
daycares will not be able to absorb the costs and thus will be
unable to subsidize the parents' interests in a safer facility for
their children. On the other hand, shifting the cost to the par-
ents may have serious consequences. If the additional cost is
substantial, many of these lower-income parents will be unable
to afford daycare. If they cannot find some family member to
watch their children, they may have to leave their jobs.167
Employer provided daycares also face negative effects
from the increased risk of economic liability in a child molesta-
tion claim. In light of the lack of sufficient insurance coverage
for sexual child abuse, employers might decide that on or near-
site daycare is not worth the economic risk. Such employers
may cease providing on or near-site daycare for their employ-
ees. Others may choose never to establish or support such day-
cares.'68 By eliminating the activity, the employer eliminates
the risk attendant with that activity.
The risk, however, is not eliminated without cost. In the-
ory, businesses will calculate the loss of job satisfaction and
productivity that is incurred by not providing on or near-site
daycare for their employees. They will similarly calculate the
loss of potentially valuable employees who will not work for a
company that does not provide such daycare. 169 The result of
these calculations will then be balanced against the economic
cost of liability from potential lawsuits. Theoretically,
whatever decision they make will, therefore, be economically
rational. However, that is rarely how the world works. More
167. Of course, parents' employers could raise salaries to cover the increased
expense of daycare. Many of these particular parents, however, are in the pool of
hourly workers with salaries fixed by job description. An employer will not likely
deviate from these job description categories in order to cover inflated child care costs
for a few individuals. One could argue that this simply means that, in an economic
sense, this person's value as a full-time parent is greater than his or her value as a
member of the work force. But this view takes too static a look at the entire situation.
To one who wants to enter the work place, a job provides a sense of worth and
individual satisfaction that is transferred back to the family. A job also provides an
image to other family members about the desirability of productive work.
168. The companies may, of course, still offer some form of "voucher" system. See
supra note 139.
169. Twenty-nine percent of working parents interviewed in a recent survey who
had a child under twelve had given up a job or promotion because of the lack of
qualified child care. A. Hoggerty, Lawmakers Eye Child Care, Parental Leave, NAT'L
UNDERWRITER (Life Health Finan. Serv. Edition), Oct. 11, 1989, at 28. Of course, that
does not mean that none of those parents would have accepted vouchers if on or near-
site care was not offered.
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likely, a vice president will talk to a vice president, someone
will say something in a management meeting, and the decision
to terminate daycare services will be based upon some emo-
tional gestalt. Of course, even with increased risk of suit,
employers may continue to provide daycare services. On-site
daycare may eventually be thought of as akin to a right that
employers have to provide in labor contracts, even without
comparable concessions by labor. The risk will then be par-
tially subsidized by reducing profits. In other words, share-
holders and other investors will pay. Under these
circumstances, one can imagine a large, successful lawsuit lead-
ing to lay-offs. Even outside the formal labor situation, the sig-
nificance of working parents in the work force might be so
great, and their insistence on daycare that is accessible during
work so pervasive, 170 that businesses will simply have to bite
the bullet, pay for whatever insurance coverage they can, put
their assets on the line, and rely on techniques such as screen-
ing to reduce their risks.
Another possible negative consequence of increased liabil-
ity to potential Group C defendants might be that the busi-
nesses would consider requiring their employees to be self-
insurers against the risk of child molestation. Businesses
might require employees to sign a waiver of the right to sue
the company as a condition of the company providing on or
near-site child care.' 7 ' In theory, the parents/employees would
170. Interestingly, the Insurance Institute speculated that the only medium and
smaller-sized employers who would demand insurance for on-site daycare were those
with either special employee requirements such as hospitals and other 24-hour
operations or factories in remote locations where daycare is otherwise unavailable.
INSURANCE INSTITUTE, supra note 135. BE&K Construction Company has set up
Bekare, a daycare operating out of trailers at each construction site. Claudia H.
Deutsch, Getting Women Down to the Site, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 11, 1990, at F1.
171. Such a waiver may not be valid. Unless appointed as guardian, a parent
generally has no authority "to compromise or release claims or causes of action
belonging to the child." Loesch v. Vassiliades, 86 A.2d 14, 15 (N.J. 1952); see also
Salmeron v. United States, 724 F.2d 1357 (9th Cir. 1983). In fact, even an appointed
guardian needs the agreement of the court to enter into a binding settlement of the
child's claims. Loesch, 86 A.2d at 15.
In some respects, the daycare waiver is analogous to the parent's waiver in the
litigation situation. In both cases the child obtains a benefit in return for insuring the
other party against a class of risk. In the litigation situation, the child receives certain
compensation without the risk of losing or even having to go through a trial, and the
defendant gains insurance against the risk of even greater loss, public exposure, and
other potential negatives. In the daycare situation, the child attends a daycare where
his or her parents are accessible, while daycare operator is insured against the risk of a
future lawsuit.
Arguably, however, there are distinctions between the two situations which may
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balance the economic and emotional benefit to them and their
family of on-site, employer-provided daycare against the emo-
tional cost of not having regular access to their child during
the day.
But this abstracted calculus does not reflect reality. As a
self-insurer, the parents will not be in the position to avoid the
risk of molestation unless they leave their jobs every five min-
utes to inspect the daycares. Also, this abstract calculus misses
all the main points that support on-site or near-site daycare to
employee or employer. Parents want to have access to their
younger children during the work day. This is a philosophy of
parenting, not of economics. Companies, on the other hand,
need to be able to attract women and, increasingly, other vari-
eties of single parents. Additionally, they want their employ-
ees to feel good about the company. The old "sign this waiver"
notion is not likely to accomplish either of these goals of
employer or employee or to instill much confidence in the day-
care for that matter.
Finally, state agencies charged with licensing and supervis-
ing daycares will also be affected by the potential increase in
the number of civil lawsuits. The agencies will tend to conduct
licensing procedures more carefully. 7 ' This may also cause
agencies to become too risk-aversive and deny licenses to
otherwise appropriate daycare facilities. Legislation might be
passed articulating in detail procedures for screening the appli-
cants for licenses, supervising the applicants, and for the struc-
tural requirements for daycare facilities.
The agencies will also tend to be more careful in con-
ducting their investigation and enforcement activities. Corre-
spondingly, the legislature may perceive that the costs of the
lawsuits are greater than the money that is needed for the nec-
support permitting parental waiver in the daycare situation. First, the potential
conflict of interest that may be involved when parents bargain over a money
settlement for their child would not seem to arise in the daycare situation. Second, the
substance of the waiver seems different. In contrast to the litigation situation, no
actual cause of action is involved in the daycare waiver. The child has suffered no
harm and is statistically unlikely to do so.
Third, the child seems to receive something different. The child does not need to
settle his or her claim to obtain compensation in the litigation situation because he or
she can go to trial. This is not so with the daycare situation. Without a waiver, there
will be no on-site daycare for the child. Of course, courts still might find such waivers
void as against public policy, to the extent that they believe that such waivers decrease
the incentive of daycares to reduce the risk of sexual abuse.
172. CQ supra note 155.
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essary agency supervision. If so, it may budget more money for
agency investigation and enforcement.
Like more care in the licensing process, intensification at
the investigative and enforcement end will also tend to reduce
the incidents of sexual abuse in daycares. If increased funds
are put into these agencies, of course, the money has to come
from somewhere.
Who pays for the increased cost of investigation and
enforcement? There are only two choices. The costs can be
passed on to the taxpayers through a revenue measure on the
theory that if taxpayers don't pay for improved agency supervi-
sion now, they will have to pay a much greater cost in legal
judgments later. If private insurance is involved, and the
insurer will continue to cover child sexual abuse, then citizens
will pay in the form of increased premiums. Alternatively, the
money can come from the existing budget of some other
agency or governmental service.
We have seen that an increased risk of economic liability is
likely to cause Group C potential defendants to change their
ways to reduce the risk of child molestation. Such changes
include improved facility design, employee screening, and
employee supervision. Such increased liability, however, is a
double-edged sword. Risk adverse daycares may hesitate to
hire well qualified people. Nonprofit and employer operated
daycares may be put out of business by increasing costs. In
addition, employer operated daycares may cause parents to
become self-insurers. Finally, state agencies may spend more
money licensing and inspecting daycares. Again, we must con-
sider the sweeping impact increased economic risk is likely to
have when evaluating the admissibility of videotaped testi-
mony in civil child molestation trials.
3. Consequences of Accepting Videotaped Testimony on the
Behavior of Insurance Companies
All of the categories in Group C will respond to the risk of
increased liability through lawsuits by acting to decrease the
risk of loss from potential sexual child abuse. However, the
response of the insurance companies, the principal protectors
against ultimate loss, will be the major factor in fully assessing
the consequences of an increase in the number of successful
plaintiff suits for sexual child abuse. As such, it will be helpful
to first briefly review the history of the relationship between
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insurance companies and daycares before assessing the likely
effect of insurance on deterring sexual child abuse. We begin
with the so-called "insurance crisis" of 1984-1985,1s then look
at the present, speculate on the future, and finally return to
the subject of insurance and deterrence.
a. The "Insurance Crisis" of 1984-1985
The 1984-1985 year saw, not only a cry for tort reform,'74
but also a sharp contraction in the availability of liability cov-
erage.175  During that period, many insurers completely
stopped providing liability insurance to daycares.Y7 6 Of the few
insurers that remained in the market, most raised premiums at
extraordinary rates; a 300% to 500% hike was not unusual.
177
In a poll conducted by Business Insurance magazine during
this time, of 250 daycares polled, two-thirds had experienced
cancellation, non-renewal or huge premium hikes. 7 8 Daycares
that lost their insurance in states requiring liability insurance
for licensing were immediately put out of business.'7 9 Others
closed shop for obvious economic reasons. They could not
afford the premiums, nor could they pass the cost on to their
customers."'8
There is no doubt that some of the sensationalist publicity
173. Some have disputed the existence of an insurance crisis brought on by the
tort system. According to these people, the insurance companies paid the price of cut-
throat competition, bad investments, and plummeting interest rates. Priest, supra note
146, at 214.
174. For a very carefully researched article that questions both the assumptions
underlying the tort reform movement and the relationship of subsequent legislative
"solutions" to the underlying problems, see Sanders & Joyce, supra note 147.
175. This quote from a business magazine of that era should give some flavoring:
In the glory days of 1978 to 1983, underwriters took on lots of business to get
premium income they could invest. Now that interest rates have fallen and
the insurers face bills for calamities ranging from Bhopal to toxic shock, they
are cutting back on low-return, high-risk specialities. These include
malpractice and product liability along with child care.
Pave, supra note 100, at 114.
176. See Litan, supra note 86, at I ("... and [for] daycare centers, coverage is
simply no longer available in some areas."); LeRoux, supra note 164.
177. Linda Kocolowski, 300-500% Premium Hikes Are Reported in the Tightening
Daycare Liability Market, NAT'L UNDERWRITER (Property & Cas./Risks Benefits
Management Ins. Edition), May 24, 1985, at 2.
178. LeRoux, supra note 164, at 2.
179. Id.
180. The issue became one of scale, with only the larger daycares able to pass the
premium hikes on to their clients. Kocolowski, Why Me?, supra note 165, at 4. But see
supra note 134 and infra notes 199-202 and accompanying text, discussing how most
family home daycares continue without insurance.
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about sex abuse cases in daycares, as opposed to any true actua-
rial losses, contributed to the insurance companies' dramatic
response to daycares.' 8s There were, however, specific charac-
teristics of the daycare market that made the insurance compa-
nies uneasy. First, tort law tolled the normal statute of
limitations and allowed children to sue for injuries up until the
time they were eighteen. 8 2 That meant that an insurance
company could face a multi-million dollar lawsuit fifteen years
after the alleged abuse of a three-year-old. This filled the com-
panies with the worst feeling that an insurance company can
know: total uncertainty.' 3
The feeling of uncertainty was exacerbated by the fact
that companies did not have a very extensive history regarding
claims from daycares and therefore could not make confident
actuarial projections."s Insurance companies faced additional
uncertainty because these cases potentially carried very high
losses, including the archetype of unpredictability, "pain and
suffering." As one representative of the insurance industry so
eloquently put it, "suppose five kids are molested, twice each
year [over the course of a year]. One pervert could lose you
$10 million."'1 5
Other factors made insurance companies view daycares as
risky ventures. The coming 1986 Tax Reform Act contained
provisions which discouraged carrying large loss reserves1 86
This discouraged insurance companies from taking on a lot of
181. See Kocolowski, Why Me?, supra note 165, at 2.
182.'[A]ll [the underwriters] can see is the long tail of liability, because we're
dealing with, for the most part, kids under 5 years old. They can file a lawsuit
until they reach the age of majority. That long a statute of limitations makes
insurers very nervous.'
Kocolowski, Why Me?, supra note 165, at 32. See, e.g., Jessica H. v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
202 Cal. Rptr. 239, 240-41 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). See also 51 AM, JUR. 2D Limitation of
Actions § 182 (1970).
183. "So far no company has had to pay a big day-care settlement. 'But you don't
have to lose a case to see it coming,' says Elizabeth Krupnick, a spokeswoman for
Aetna Life and Casualty Co." Pave, upra note 100, at 114. See also Kari Berman,
Daycare Liability Coverage Available, But Limited, Bus. INS., Oct. 10, 1988, at 17
(insurance companies are still worried about the potential for child abuse cases);
Kocolowski, Why Me, supra note 165; McKibbin, supra note 63, at 480 ("Based upon
these incident rates [of total molestations per year,] the risk exposure of the insurance
industry may be conservatively estimated at $250,000,000 annually.").
184. "'There's no question that they [insurance companies] have very little
historic data on instances of child abuse or settlements of child abuse claims
originating from daycare centers.'" Kocolowski, Why Me?, supra note 165, at 32.
185. Pave, supra note 100, at 114.
186. As a result of the 1986 Tax Law, insurance companies had to discount their
loss reserves. Berman, supra note 141, at 18.
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potential long-term risk. Additionally, these daycares, many of
which were of the family home variety, did not bring in very
large premiums. 8 7  Taken together, the enormous risks of
insuring daycares provided insurers with a choice: stop cover-
ing daycares' s or make daycares pay through the roof.
The insurance industry's choice, however, was not made in
a vacuum. It took place against the backdrop of the feminiza-
tion of the American workplace. Forty-five percent of
America's workers were women, seventy percent of whom
were in their child-bearing years.189 The number of working
mothers with children under six nearly doubled from 1970 to
1987.19 Without daycares, how were women going to be able
to stay in the work force in large numbers?
What solved the crisis? State legislatures provided part of
the solution. Some required all insurance companies doing
business in the state to join a joint underwriting association.191
187. Kocolowski, Why Me?, supra note 165, at 32.
188. Additionally, the major provider of daycare insurance, Mission Insurance Co.
of California, suddenly withdrew from the market in 1985. Mission previously drove
several other national companies out of the daycare insurance business by
underpricing them, sometimes by as much as 50%. (Interestingly, when Mission was
subsequently declared insolvent, an audit by the California Insurance Commissioner
revealed that Mission had been selling below cost.) The withdrawal of Mission left
thousands of daycares scrambling for coverage in a generally constricting market from
which all other national providers had previously withdrawn. INSURANCE INSTITUTE,
supra note 135.
189. Roger Barnes, Childcare Grabs Benefits Spotlight, NAVL UNDERWRITER
(Property & Cas./Risks Benefits Management Ins. Edition), Apr. 10, 1989, at 23. The
study cited defined "child bearing" years as ages 25-34. Id.
190. Matis, supra note 155, at 577 n.21.
191. See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE §§ 48.88.010-48.88.070 (1989). The Washington
statute was specifically designed to address the unavailability of liability insurance for
daycare providers. It ordered the insurance commissioner to establish a nonprofit joint
underwriting association for daycare insurance. All insurance companies providing
property and casualty insurance in the state are required to be members. WASH. REV.
CODE § 48.88.040 (1989). Day care licensees can apply to the association to purchase
insurance. The association is required to offer applicants a policy with limits of at least
one hundred thousand dollars per occurence. WASH. REV. CODE § 48.88.050 (1989).
South Carolina has pursued a similar solution. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 38-89-10
through 38-89-190 (Law. Co-op. 1985) (Supp. 1990). As in Washington, the purpose of
requiring membership in the joint underwriting association was to address the
availability of daycare liability insurance. S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-89-20. In South
Carolina, the joint underwriting association is only activated when the insurance
commission finds and declares the existance of an emergency. S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-
89-20. The South Carolina statute does not specify a minimum dollar amount of
coverage per occurance, but requires the association to issue policies if the applicant
meets the association's underwriting standards. S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-89-50.
The Minnesota legislature also enacted a joint underwriting association statute in
1985. MINN. STAT. § 621.02 (1991).
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In addition, at least one state statute provides for daycare cen-
ters to join in pools as self-insurers. 192 In addition to action
taken by state legislatures, Congress contemplated but rejected
a federal reinsurance program for daycares.' 93
b. Past the "Crises," to Today and Beyond
By early 1986, however, the word was out that liability
insurance for daycares was readily available and that the only
obstacle to obtaining insurance was its cost.194 This expense, in
turn, was apparently only a real problem for family home day-
cares.'95 By 1990, it appears that employer-sponsored daycare
is very affordable, running between $60 and $180 per child per
year, with most employers paying near the lower end of the
cost spectrum.196
The transformation occurred because the insurance indus-
try realized it could generate profits while minimizing its
risk.197 When insurance companies assessed the actuarial real-
ity of the childcare market, they realized that it was poten-
tially profitable as long as they eliminated the risk of "adverse
selection"'198 by eliminating the only true high-risk members of
the market: the small family home daycare.19
In truth, the companies had good reasons for this conclu-
sion. Insurance agents indicate that most of the instances of
192. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ch. 48.90 (1989).
193. See Berman, supra note 141, at 17. These federal programs, which are still
under periodic consideration to date, face critics who argue that such a program will
allow a larger number of unsafe daycares to operate. Idl See also Linda Kocolowski,
Daycare Liability Insurance Woes Prompt Federal and State Inquiries, NAT'L
UNDERWRITER (Property & Cas./Ins. Edition), Jul. 19, 1985, at 1.
194. Robert A. Finlayson, Regulation Not Necessary to Ensure Availability:
Report, Bus. INS., Mar. 24, 1986, at 12. This article was principally based upon the
initial survey of the Insurance Information Institute, supra note 135.
195. Finlayson, supra, note 194, at 12.
196. Mary Jane Fisher, Child-care Insurance Available, Affordable: Labor, NAT'L
UNDERWRITER (Property & Cas./Risks Benefits Management Ins. Edition), Jan. 22,
1990, at 27.
197. Much of the following discussion is based on interviews with representatives
of insurance companies and insurance agents.
198. "Adverse Selection is the tendency for high risks to buy more coverage than
low risks at any given rate." Scott E. Harrington, Prices and Profits in the Liability
Insurance Marke in LIABILT: PERSPECTVES AND POLICY 46 (Robert E. Litan &
Clifford Winston eds.). To the extent that most of the half-dozen or so providers that
operate on a national level have huge deductibles, they act in effect as self-insurers
and import adverse selection into the daycare insurance market.
199. Representatives of nationally-recognized insurance companies support this
conclusion almost unanimously. Interviews with insurance company representatives
and agents, week of Sept. 12, 1990.
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child abuse in daycares have taken place in these family home
situations. This, in itself, is not surprising. Since the vast
majority of children who were in daycares five years ago were
in family run daycare facilities,2 ° one would expect that statis-
tically the vast majority of abuse cases would arise in these
facilities.
In addition to the sheer numbers, however, there are other
factors that increase the risk of family owned daycares. These
daycares operate out of the owner's private home. Homes are
rife with opportunities for adults to isolate children away from
others. There are very few employees, and therefore there are
not many adults around to watch each other. Employees tend
to be neither intensely screened, nor carefully trained. As a
result of assessing these risks, the insurance companies explic-
itly excluded sexual child abuse from all of their policies.2°1
In addition, at about the time that insurance companies
began to realize that they had a product which was very low
risk20 2 and for which there was high demand, the economic
cycle in which insurance companies appear to regularly find
themselves began to shift from a "hard" to a "soft" market.0 3
200. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
201. "[Following a rash of day-care center child abuse incidents, all day-care
center liability policies now specifically exclude coverage for child abuse and
molestation." Berman, supra note 141, at 17. See also INSURANCE INSTITUTE, supra
note 135. See also Monique Parsons, Daycare Liability Cover Available, Bus. INS.,
Sept. 4, 1989, at 26.
202. This was also not an area where insurance companies were likely to face the
so-called problem of "moral hazard." "Moral hazard" is the concept that the mere fact
of being insured will make people less risk adverse and therefore make it more likely
that they will commit acts for which the insurance company will be eventually liable
to compensate. Harrington, supra note 198, at 47. This concept is not likely to apply
here. As previously discussed, economic risks do not concern the molester, and the
business has incentive enough to prevent having a child molested in their care.
Additionally, insurance will not be a disincentive to the children's parents to carefully
investigate the daycare to which they send their children. Some parents will no doubt
be more or less careful in selecting the daycare, but whatever standard of care they
take will be a function of who they are as parents and how they generally deal with
the world rather than whether the daycare has an insurance policy.
203. "Soft markets" are those that offer "readily available coverage at falling
prices." Harrington, supra note 198, at 77. In contrast, "hard markets" are those in
which parties have trouble obtaining coverage and face high prices. Id Although the
insurance industry views hard versus soft market cycles as accepted wisdom, the
phenomenon is not really explained by either theory or empirical study. Id. This
study was sponsored by the Brookings Institute to ask, "[w]hy would rational, profit-
maximizing firms have a persistent tendency in the first place to price business below
cost so that retrenchment en masse is inevitably needed to avoid financial collapse?"
I& at 78. The study answers by simply calling for more research, finds flaws with all,
and ends. I& at 91. See also Sanders & Joyce, supra note 147, at 214 n.32 ("No one
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Unlike a hard market, in which the capacity for insurance con-
stricts, in a soft market insurance companies will tend to take
a far more expansive view of providing insurance coverage. In
those areas where the market is soft, insurers are "offering
coverage for anything they can get their hands on because the
business is not premiums, but the money that companies are
making on the investment with the premiums. '"2 4 What does
all of this mean in specific terms for daycares across the coun-
try today?
First, it is impossible to generalize about what is happen-
ing across the country. Most of the preferred companies 2°5 still
do not insure daycares.2°6 Those that do are typically insuring
large commercial facilities, sometimes national corporations,207
or providing coverage under the umbrella policies of such
established institutions as churches or medical centers.
Insurance companies uniformly exclude child sex abuse
coverage for all but their most valued customers. As the mar-
ket becomes more competitive, more companies offer riders
that cover sex abuse. Such a rider is not extraordinarily
expensive if the daycare provider can qualify. For example,
one agent reported that if a daycare had five years experience
without any significant claims, on a $2,000 a year policy for lia-
bility coverage, a sexual abuse rider could be purchased for an
additional ten to twenty percent.208 The rider, however, gener-
ally would have a ceiling far below the policy limits. For
example, in a $500,000 liability policy, the sexual abuse rider
may be limited to $50,000 per occurrence, or even per insur-
doubts the existence of the [insurance] cycle, but the reasons for its existence remain
subject to speculation."). Perhaps then it is not so surprising that I had difficulty
obtaining a single, coherent explanation of how insurance companies are responding to
the daycare market.
204. Interview with representative of nationally-recognized insurance company.
Sept. 12, 1990.
205. "Preferred" companies take traditional risks; they are the companies whose
names the general public recognizes as "insurance companies."
206. For example, according to an interview with a member of the Washington
State Insurance Commission on September 5, 1990, of 633 carriers which sold property
casualty in the state, only 21 underwrote daycares. Carriers wrote $523,000 in
premiums on daycare insurance, whereas they wrote $3 billion in other property
casualty markets. This is somewhat revealing in that the Pacific Northwest is
considered a very soft market. On the other hand, insurance for employer-sponsored
daycare is readily available.
207. The national daycares are, however, effectively self-insurers; supra note 192.
208. Interview with agent of nationally recognized insurer. (Week of Sept. 12,
1991).
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ance period. °
Most of the coverage for daycare facilities is provided by
so-called "surplus line" companies.210 These are companies
who are statutorily authorized to offer coverage to people who
have been turned down by the so-called "preferred" compa-
nies.2 1 ' While surplus line companies are willing to insure cat-
egories of risk that the preferred companies will not, they
charge much higher premiums for taking that risk. The cost of
obtaining insurance may differ vastly between facilities
because the ratings of daycares for insurance risk and the
accompanying cost of coverage is extremely individualized,
with the rates sometimes differing dramatically from facility to
facility. Claims history, nature of the physical facilities, types
of activities, number of children for which the facility is
licensed, professional versus volunteer staff, and child-staff
ratio all play into the equation.212 While a $2,000 premium per
year for a daycare facility is not uncommon, some pay $8,000
and others $13,000. Remember that this coverage specifically
excludes sexual child abuse, unless the company offers a rider
and the daycare is among a select group that can qualify.
This does not seem to concern most daycare operators.
Their personal experiences cause them to be more concerned
about liability for accidents than for sexual abuse."1 ' While
increased competition for the daycare insurance business has
209. Generally this is only intended to be enough to cover legal expenses, not any
damage award. INSURANCE INSTrUTE, supra note 135.
210. Interestingly, there are many surplus line companies and, if a daycare finds
an agent that represents these companies, the daycare can likely find coverage. The
problem, especially among smaller daycare facilities and family home daycares, is that
the owners only know about the preferred companies, and when they get turned down,
they do not know know where to turn.
211. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 48.15.040 (1989).
212. This list is based on interviews with agents representing surplus line
companies insuring daycares. According to the report of the Insurance Information
Institute the factors that affect affordability include:
* ratio of staff to children
* number and ages of children
* location of facility (not only as far as the region of the country and city,
but also whether the facility is in a suburban setting or on a busy city street
corner)
* outside activities (i.e., additional sports activities, field trips)
* transportation involved
213. Owners see the choice of operating a daycare facility without any liability
insurance as a very serious matter, but not for the reasons one might imagine. The
smaller daycare operators with whom I spoke believed that they were very careful in
taking care of the children. Although the smaller daycares saw it as inevitable that
some children would get hurt in accidents, they felt that the employees of the daycare
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begun to bring the cost of liability insurance down,214 there are
still operators that have trouble paying for liability insurance.
What about the family home daycares that, as of 1985, sup-
posedly accommodated two-thirds of our nation's children who
were in daycare? 215 A few surplus line companies will provide
family home daycares with a liability rider on their home-
owner policy if they have both a good claims history and only a
few children in the daycare. Most companies, however, will
not give a "business endorsement" on the homeowner's policy
of the daycare owner.216
Almost all insurers will refuse to provide family home
daycares with commercial insurance, even if it were possible
for someone watching four or five kids at a time to pay
thousands of dollars in insurance.1 7 As for the relatively
small number of family home daycares that are able to obtain
liability insurance, almost all liability policies exclude sexual
child abuse.218  In summary, liability insurance is extremely
hard for family home daycares to find, and when they do find
it, it invariably excludes sexual child abuse and generally costs
far more than the owner can afford.21
9
would not be found at fault. The operators were less concerned with the ultimate cost
of paying a judgment than with the costs of our very expensive legal system.
214. This is based on interviews with agents and insurance company employees.
One daycare owner told me that her insurance premium had been "cut in half" the
last year. See also INSURANCE INSTITUTE, supra note 135.
215. See supra note 100.
216. However, in 1986 the insurance industry developed standardized language for
attachments to homeowners' insurance policies to make it easier for providers of
family-home daycare to shop for insurance. INSURANCE INSTITUTE, supra note 135.
According to interviews with agents and daycare providers, the good intentions have
not been realized.
For a definition of business endorsement, see supra note 134.
217. According to an interview with an agent who handled surplus line companies,
a few family home daycares have successfully threatened to cancel their policies and
leave their agents unless the daycares were given liability coverage. More typically,
home daycares have found their homeowner's insurance cancelled when companies
learn that they are running daycares. Although liability from such a business is
specifically excluded from every homeowner's policy, companies are not willing to take
the chance that they could be dragged into court and have a judge who is sympathetic
to the plaintiff interpret the policy without the exclusion.
218. As to the infinitesimally small number of policies that cover sexual child
abuse in family home daycares, the coverage for abuse either has an extremely low
ceiling or the coverage is limited to acts by employees. Because most family home
daycares do not have any employees, the cost is obviously too high for too little return
for even those owners who can obtain these rare coverages.
219. Agents view the matter somewhat differently than the family home daycare
owners. As one agent who represented surplus line companies put it: "They want
$65.00 riders on their homeowner's, or a full commercial policy with 'all the bells and
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Given the problem that family home daycares have
obtaining insurance and given the number of children that
these homes care for, one would expect to have heard a serious
clamor over the situation similar to the public outcry in the
mid-80's. The absence of such outcry suggests a number of pos-
sibilities. First, some daycares may have folded because of
their inability to pay. Second, some may be functioning with-
out insurance and, in those jurisdictions requiring insurance as
a condition for licensing, are unlicensed. Third, daycares may
be responding to what all of us perceive to be a significant rise
in the number of children entering daycare over the past five
years. Fourth, national and state associations may have formed
to offer either referral sources to available insurers or actual
insurance pools in which the home daycares can participate at
comparatively low premiums. Finally, daycare facilities may
have filled some of the void resulting from the exodus of fam-
ily home daycares from the business.
In reality, all five of these factors have helped daycares to
cope with the realities of the insurance market. The most sig-
nificant appear to be the formation of local, state, and national
associations to assist family home daycares (and smaller day-
care facilities),220 and the startling reality already discussed
that the vast majority of family home daycares are operating
without any liability insurance.
What then awaits daycares in the future? Large commer-
cial daycares will not likely face any serious difficulties. In
fact, if insurance costs rise, they may find themselves taking
over more market share because costs of remaining in and
entering into the business are too great for the small scale
organization. 221 The fate of smaller daycare facilities will
whistles' for $150.00. They don't get it. Those days of insurance at those rates are
gone, and they're never coming back. For God's sake, they're paying $6.00 for a movie
now ....
220. These range from truly national organizations, such as the National
Association of Daycare Providers, headquartered in Dallas, Texas with members in 30
states, to organizations working in a single county, such as the Thurston County Child
Care Action Counsel in Washington State. The National Association, a nonprofit
organization which subsists on member dues, offers relatively inexpensive sexual
abuse excluded liability insurance to its qualifying members. For daycare facilities, the
charge is a function of both the number of children for which the facility is licensed
and the ceiling on coverage: $100,000 coverage, $12/child; $500,000 coverage, $24/child.
Family home daycares pay $150 for $100,000 per policy period coverage.
221. If this scenario comes to fruition, something may be lost. Many of these
smaller daycare facilities no doubt gave the type of caring supervision that might be
lacking in more institutionalized centers. However, some of this caring may be gained
19921
330 University of Puget Sound Law Review
depend to an extent on whether the insurance market is soft
or hard. Associations will play increasingly important roles
both as insurers and as lobbying groups. States are likely to
intensify their licensing requirements for all persons taking
care of children that are not members of their own family.
222
c. The Interplay Between Insurance and Deterrence
This journey through the history and future of daycare
and liability insurance provides a background for assessing the
extent to which the insurance process can itself serve as an
instrument for reducing the risk of sexual child abuse.22s First,
insurance companies now impose fairly strict standards on the
daycares they do insure.2 4 Many of these standards specifi-
cally relate to the physical safety of the child. Others, such as
guidelines for screening employees that require prior criminal
records be checked and necessary ratios of staff to children be
kept, tend to reduce the possibility of sexual child abuse.
Second, the riders available for sexual child abuse have a
relatively low ceiling on liability. Even daycares that have
been able to obtain these riders risk exceeding the policy limit
if suit is brought. These daycares retain a strong economic
incentive to carefully screen and supervise their employees.
Third, the daycares know that they can lose their insur-
ance if they have any problems resulting in serious claims. If
back as employers provide more on-site and near-site daycare with which the parents
can become more intimately involved.
222. If these licensing requirements include minimum liability insurance, and if
the states provide resources that enable them to uncover those family home daycares
that are not licensed, we will likely face another round of talks about government
subsidized daycare insurance. Even if daycare in the workplace increases, however, all
of the daycare facilities currently in operation could not absorb the number of children
that would be released if the majority of family home daycares in this country were
closed.
223. If insurers threaten "cancellation and nonrenewal" or require "safety
measures . . . as a condition of coverage," liability insurance itself can reinforce
deterrence. Sugarman, supra note 146, at 137.
224. See Berman, supra note 141, at 18. As an example, the National Association
of Daycare Providers' requirements for coverage include: the owner or director must
have three years experience; the daycare must have no significant history of lawsuits;
it must be licensed and it must follow all requirements imposed by the state legislature
and appropriate agencies; it must have written procedures for early release of a child
or release to a nonparent; it must offer safety measures and specified minimum square
footage per child. See supra note 138. Also, according to the report of the Insurance
Information Institute, rates were lower in states with strict licensing and inspection
standards; supra note 135.
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insurance is a licensing requirement, failure to insure means
going out of business.
But what happens if the evidentiary arguments are
accepted and more civil child abuse cases are successfully pros-
ecuted? For daycares, nothing as disastrous as what happened
in the mid-80s should ensue. At this date, insurance companies
have clearly delineated general liability for accidents from lia-
bility for child sexual abuse. Increases in the number and costs
of judgments for child sexual abuse should only affect insur-
ance companies who have issued a special rider for that loss.
225
Therefore, there is no reason why the general liability insur-
ance policy should be affected at all, and it is that policy that is
necessary for daycares to function. Because the standards
insurance companies impose on daycares to obtain liability
insurance include measures that also discourage sexual abuse,
not much deterrence will be lost even if companies cease offer-
ing riders.
That is all well and good for the insurance and daycare
industries, but what about the abused child? After all, concern
for child welfare was the basis for even proposing the eviden-
tiary arguments for videotaped depositions. In spite of an
increased risk of liability due to the admission of videotaped
testimony, both commercial and family daycares are likely to
have either no sexual abuse coverage or expensive, limited cov-
erage. In either case, although the child may be more likely to
win a judgment against the defendant, his or her opportunity
to collect on that judgment will remain elusive.
IV. CONCLUSION: SOME FINAL CONSEQUENCES AND A FABLE
This journey began with the presumption that courts are
more and more likely to admit videotaped depositions in civil
child abuse litigation. The admission of this evidence is likely
to have wide ranging results. It may have a broad, systemic
effect on our adversarial values. In particular, the admission of
such evidence may effect our preference for live trials. In
addition, releasing a child from testifying at a trial will effect
the interests of parents, children, and attorneys. Admitting
this evidence may increase the number of child abuse suits that
225. To the extent that some daycares are covered under umbrella policies of a
larger organization such as a school or hospital, and to the extent that the policies
cover all torts, including sexual abuse, the daycares will likely see specific exclusions
added to policies at the time of renewal.
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are brought; it may also lead to higher settlements and more
judgments for plaintiffs. However, such suits are only likely to
result in compensation when they are brought against institu-
tional defendants. Thus, many children who obtain judgments
will be left without compensation.
Nor does the journey reveal that the threat of litigation
resulting from the admission of videotaped testimony in civil
child abuse cases will have a clear deterrent effect on defend-
ants. Individual abusers, who appear to be unmotivated by
existing deterrents, are unlikely to be more motivated by the
increased risk of litigation. In contrast, some spouses and fam-
ily daycares may be more likely to be deterred. Institutional
daycares are the most likely defendants to be deterred by the
admission of this testimony. However, the fact that few day-
cares are insured negatively affects deterrence because such
daycares do not have to cope with insurance requirements.
Although the economic risk of more lawsuits is likely to
reduce the risk of child abuse, there are potential drawbacks to
such incentives. The primary drawback is that daycares may
not be able to afford the cost of increased screening and super-
vision and may close their doors. Other potential daycares,
fearing the risks, may never open their doors. Thus, although
the introduction of video depositions holds the promise of
increased compensation for victims and deterrence of future
harm, in reality the admission of this testimony may result in a
decrease in the availability of daycare, an increase in the cost
of existing daycare, with little or no increased compensation
for the children and no clear deterrent effect.
In many ways, our journey has been a fable, a fable about
what sometimes happens when the projects of our best moral
impulses look to the litigation system for realization. The
fable begins with characters clearly delineated along the lines
of good and evil. There is the strong, good judge who is willing
to follow a path through the evidentiary rules to help the good,
innocent child obtain redress from the bad, evil child molester.
Lawyers become involved in the next part of the fable, and the
bad, evil child molester all but disappears, perhaps leaving
behind him questions about the fairness of trial by video. At
least, however, we have the good, innocent child for whom the
path to redress has been cleared.
Then, something funny happens. The good, strong judge,
the good, innocent child, the attorneys (who are just attor-
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neys), just like the bad evil child molester before them, all but
disappear from the story. In their place are institutions-
large, national daycares and huge insurance companies. The
only people left are good, innocent parents of small children,
many of whom cannot afford substantial daycare costs.
Worse yet, we find that the good, innocent child, except in
an extremely narrow set of circumstances, will not gain any
economic redress after all, will not be empowered by the pro-
cess, and is unlikely to have his or her actions in bringing suit
add much of anything to deterring other acts of child molesta-
tion. In fact, eventually the good, strong judge's decision to
help the good, innocent child will likely wind up with there
being less money available to compensate children who have
been sexually molested. The decision may even eliminate the
availability of daycare to the children of some of the good,
innocent mothers, particularly those who are part of or are
sole providers for lower income families. 226 At this point, the
journey appears bleak.
Where should the journey end? Some may argue that
because the admission of this testimony does not clearly help
the child in the long run, we should not encourage the child to
bring these cases. The choice, however, is not strictly ours.
The child has the right to bring these cases. That being so, it
makes little sense to force a child to go through an emotionally
traumatic episode when less traumatic alternatives are avail-
able that do not really harm the child or prejudice defendants.
Others may argue that the journey should end in a world
where the law does not make unkeepable promises to children.
226. In fairness, however, the potential consequences of admitting videotaped
testimony are not immediately and apparently dire. In other words, even if suits for
sexual child abuse are brought against daycares, and insurance is not provided to
satisfy these suits, most daycares will still function. But what if the admission of
videotaped testimony would result in the unavailability of general liability insurance
and therefore the closure of most daycares in this country? In such circumstances, we
might discourage child sexual abuse suits in our legal system. I doubt, however, that
we would discourage the results through a manipulation of the evidentiary law.
Instead, we would likely alter the substantive law either in defining burdens or
granting immunity to certain parties.
Although some rules of evidence are responses to business practices, the evidence
law has changed in regard to business in general. We do not have the "insurance
business" exception or the "industries that would be susceptible to undesirable
financial disorientation if we were to allow suits to be brought easily against them"
exception. Playing with the general principles of evidence law that are involved in the
admission of videotaped testimony would obviously begin to distort the entire body of
law. For this reason alone, the courts will not likely take this approach in dealing with
a problem whose solution appears to be to discourage only certain types of lawsuits.
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That, however, is not a realistic goal. We propose to use the
law to solve problems, and we cannot invoke the law to solve
problems without making some promises about costs, alterna-
tives, and results.
Instead, the journey will end with an acknowledgment
that the law will make promises. But, before making these
promises through the admission of child videotaped testimony,
we should look beyond our legal texts, arguments, culture, and
conventions to the world outside. We should try to gauge how
social, psychological, and economic forces are likely to buffet
our legal solutions to see if anything will be left of these
promises once the child's journey through the legal process
and beyond has come to an end.
